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Maximizing Autonomy in the Shadow of Great Powers:  The 
Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
KYLE HATTON* & KATHARINA PISTOR** 
 
Abstract: 
 
Sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) have received a great deal of attention since 
they appeared as critical investors during the global financial crisis.  Reactions 
have ranged from fears of state intervention and mercantilism to hopes that SWFs 
will emerge as model long-term investors that will take on risky investments in 
green technology and infrastructure that few private investors are willing to touch.  
In this paper we argue that both of these reactions overlook the fact that SWFs are 
deeply embedded in the political economy of their respective sovereign sponsors.  
This paper focuses on four political entities that sponsor some of the largest SWFs 
worldwide:  Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Singapore and China.  Each of them has been 
governed for decades by elites whose grip on power has been tied to the economic 
fortune of their respective economies and their ability to pacify, or at least balance 
against, foreign powers.  We argue that for these four political entities, both the 
motives for establishing SWFs and the strategies they employ can best be ex-
plained by an “autonomy-maximization” theory. 
 
In a world where uncertainty—both economic and political—looms larger as a 
concern in the wake of the global financial crisis and political upheavals, such as 
the revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, elites use an increasingly diverse ar-
ray of tools to protect their autonomy within the global system and hedge against 
unexpected turmoil.  SWFs serve ruling elites by concentrating substantial re-
sources, which can be used to pay off domestic adversaries, to insure the economy 
against major downturns and thereby mitigate public discontent, to signal coop-
eration to major foreign powers and to increase legitimacy in the global arena by 
presenting governance structures familiar to the West.  We employ a comparative 
case study analysis to highlight the critical importance of these political economy 
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dynamics in the establishment of SWFs, their governance structures and their be-
havior in both normal times and during times of crisis.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”) have drawn increased scrutiny in recent years due to 
high-profile acquisitions of equity stakes in Western companies; however, most of these funds 
have quietly invested public wealth in diversified global portfolios for decades.  Lately, height-
ened concerns about national security interests have led to increased filings and investigations by 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),1 but the more common reac-
tion to the expanded role of SWFs in the global financial system among the general public is a 
kind of collective unease.  At the center of this unease is the opacity of SWFs’ institutional struc-
tures, strategies and goals:  it is difficult to rely comfortably on partners whose motives are un-
clear. 
Accordingly, much debate in academic circles has emerged about the motives of SWFs.  
From the alarmist camp, some have sounded warnings that SWFs portend the return of mercan-
tilism to the global economy while others have argued that they evidence the rise of a new form 
of socialism or imperialist-capitalism in emerging economies.  This anxiety is fueled by the fact 
that many SWFs tend to come from countries that are non-democratic.  On the other side, SWF 
apologists steadfastly maintain that these institutions are classic examples of rational market in-
vestors.  We believe that these explanations are lacking, in no small part because they attempt to 
reduce SWFs to terms with which Western audiences are familiar in order to elicit either protec-
tionist or free market policy responses. 
In contrast, we characterize SWFs as autonomy-maximizing institutions.2  In each of the 
countries analyzed herein, the ruling elite utilize SWFs to secure their domestic political domi-
nance against both internal and external threats.  While this interest is furthered by wealth-
maximizing choices in most instances, SWFs are not wholly neutral market actors; however, nei-
ther are they bent on imposing the policies of their sovereign sponsors on the international sys-
tem. 
This article first summarizes and briefly explains the existing accounts of SWF motives 
along with the term “autonomy-maximizer,” while showing that only the autonomy-maximizing 
story can fully explain SWF actions since their inception.  Then, case studies of SWFs in Ku-
wait, Abu Dhabi, Singapore and China are presented to ground the autonomy-maximization the-
ory in reality.    These case studies confirm that SWFs are used to maximize the autonomy of 
their sovereign sponsor and that this objective is quite consistent with each country’s behavior 
prior to its formation of SWFs.  Finally, a theoretical argument is provided as to why SWFs are 
appropriate institutions for advancing this goal. 
 
 
 1. From 2006 to 2008, filings increased by about forty percent from 111 to 155, and investigations increased from 7 to 23.  
COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S., COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE U.S. ANNUAL REP. TO CONG. (Public/Unclassified Version) 3 
(2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/2009%20CFIUS %20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
 2. The notion that SWFs are autonomy-maximizers is similar, but not identical to the argument made by Dixon and Monk 
that SWFs are used to maximize the sovereignty of the state sponsor.   Adam Dixon & Ashby H.B. Monk, Rethinking the 
Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth Funds (Aug. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1652701.  Dixon and Monk argue that SWFs improve the “sovereignty deficit [of some states] vis-
à-vis more powerful states,” enhance “a [state’s] international legal sovereignty” and further states’ domestic “Westphalian 
sovereignty.”  Id. at 9, 11.  We will distinguish these positions more carefully below under II.B. 
 
 
II.  THEORY 
SWFs have been defined as “government owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) 
investment funds that have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or the 
citizenry in abstract) and that invest their assets, either in the short or long term, according to the 
interests and objectives of the sovereign sponsor.”3  This definition is indicative in that it draws a 
clear connection between the actions of SWFs (investment) and the motives of the sovereign 
sponsor.  SWFs have accumulated vast pools of capital, so identifying these interests and objec-
tives is critical for other actors in the global economic governance system who need to determine 
whether SWFs are reliable partners.  Accurately identifying sovereign goals and objectives is, 
however, problematic:  any self-reported disclosure must be viewed skeptically, the well-
documented historical opacity of SWFs tends to frustrate independent investigation and many 
investment decisions may be consistent with multiple characterizations of the underlying SWF 
motive. 
Existing scholarly debate has attempted to explain SWF actions through several compet-
ing theoretical frameworks.  Some have theorized that SWFs are rational market actors which 
maximize financial returns—and thus reliable partners—while others argue that SWFs are ex-
ploitative institutions—and thus not to be trusted—alternatively characterizing them as mercan-
tilist, socialist-imperialist or capitalist-imperialist institutions.  This is, however, a false dichot-
omy:  it is possible to act in a manner that is neither financial-return-maximizing nor 
exploitative.  Further, none of the existing characterizations can adequately explain the full range 
of observed SWF behavior.  Based on detailed comparative analysis of the leading SWFs in the 
world and their role within the systems that sponsor them, we argue that SWFs are autonomy-
maximizing institutions.  Autonomy-maximization is consistent with the circumstances that led 
to the creation of SWFs in each of the case study countries and can explain SWFs’ historically 
passive external investment strategy, the politicized nature of their domestic investments, the use 
of SWF revenues to pacify domestic constituencies, their dollar recycling function and the ex-
traordinary investments made by SWFs during the recent financial crisis. 
A brief explanation of each of the existing alternative theories is provided below, fol-
lowed by an analysis of whether these theories can explain each of the behaviors listed above.  
We then provide an overview of our autonomy-maximizing theory, along with an analysis show-
ing how it does explain each of these behaviors. 
A.  Existing Alternative Explanations 
There are three primary existing theories of SWF objectives and motivations.  The first 
 
 3. Ashby H.B. Monk, Recasting the Sovereign Wealth Fund Debate:  Trust, Legitimacy, and Governance 10 (May 1, 
2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134862.  Of course, by 
extension, SWFs may be liable and responsive to the population at large insofar as the sovereign is accountable to the nation.  
Given that many SWFs are sponsored by non-democratic governments, however, even this indirect accountability is 
questionable. 
theory is that SWFs are mercantilist (or neo-mercantilist) institutions.  The second theory is that 
SWFs act as capitalist-imperialist (or socialist-imperialist) institutions.  SWF apologists, in con-
trast, argue that they are rational market-based investors.  None of these theories explains the full 
breadth of SWF behavior; indeed, some would predict behavior quite contrary to that actually 
observed over the last twenty years. 
In the classic sense, mercantilism proceeds from an assumption that economic exchanges 
are a zero-sum game and that accumulation of capital marks the winner.4  Between the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the governments of the emergent nation states in Europe believed that 
by regulating their economies they could enhance their geopolitical power.  Adam Smith was 
highly skeptical of the concept and advocated free trade as a superior way to foster prosperity.5  
Professors Gilson and Milhaupt have characterized SWFs as neo-mercantilist institutions that use 
“company-level behavior” to maximize “country-level . . . economic, social, and political bene-
fits.”6  According to this theory, SWF actions should be aimed at country-level maximization of 
these benefits.  Gilson and Milhaupt present little concrete support for this characterization be-
yond a passing reference to the Chinese economy and an observation that SWFs constitute “state 
involvement in the economy.”7  While Chinese trade policy may have mercantilist tendencies,8 
this does not necessarily prove that all SWFs (or even the Chinese Investment Corporation) act 
out of mercantilist impulses.  The analysis below shows that a significant portion of SWFs’ be-
havior is not explainable by country-level economic, social and political benefit maximization. 
Post-mercantilist state involvement in the economy has been alternatively explained by 
imperialist-capitalism.  While capitalism is based on private ownership of the means of produc-
tion, imperialist-capitalism means that governments become deeply involved in directing in-
vestments overseas in an attempt to marry their own interests with those of the economic elites.  
Essentially, the argument as developed by Max Weber is that higher profits are available outside 
of domestic markets and that by capturing these profits through the use of imperialist force, 
states can boost the expansion of their domestic economies more rapidly than through pacifist 
“free-trade” capitalism alone.9  Heike Schweitzer explains that if SWFs are indeed imperialist-
capitalist institutions, they should be trying to exploit the capitalist system for their own eco-
nomic and political benefit.10  Upon inspection, however, it is apparent that SWFs are neither 
“turning the tables” of imperialist force against Western economies nor engaging in imperialist 
behavior in developing states; further, the imperialist-capitalist theory does not explain several 
key categories of SWFs’ historical actions. 
The final existing theory on SWFs is that they are pure market-based rational investors.  
 
 4. See, e.g., THOMAS MUN, ENGLAND'S TREASURE BY FORRAIGN TRADE (1664); JAMES STEUART, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1770); see also FRANK HALLIDAY, ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS 464 (1974). 
 5. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 488 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). 
 6. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance:  A Minimalist Response to 
the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2008). 
 7. Id. 
 8. For an argument that China’s policy is mercantilist, see Robert J. Samuelson, China's Wrong Turn on Trade, 
NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2007, at 55. 
 9. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 918–20 (University of California Press 1978) (1921). 
 10. Heike Schweitzer, Sovereign Wealth Funds:  Market Investors or Imperialist-Capitalists, 2 EUR. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 80 
(2011). 
In the neoclassical model of economic organization, rational actors seek to maximize their inter-
ests—primarily profits.11  While most proponents of the market economy would argue that pri-
vate actors are the agents best suited to the system, an argument can be made that in highly com-
petitive markets, actors with different ownership structures or objective functions will largely 
converge in their outlook and behavior to conform to demands of the market economy.12  This is 
uniformly the motivation SWFs themselves declare;13 it is echoed by numerous commentators14 
and is presented by Epstein and Rose as a prudent default assumption due to the lack of contra-
dictory evidence.15  Under this theory, SWFs should act to maximize the financial gains accruing 
to the SWF—similarly to how a “normal” investor would structure its behavior.  While the 
wealth-maximizing explanation explains certain SWF actions, it cannot explain others without 
assuming that SWFs are occasionally completely irrational or that they represent “dumb money” 
in the marketplace. 
We believe that any theory of SWF motivation should be able to explain five particular 
courses of action that SWFs have undertaken in the past.  The following table presents a sum-
mary of our analysis, which is detailed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11. For a discussion of the homo economicus concept in historical perspective, see Bruce Carruthers, Homo 
Economicus and Homo Politicus:  Non-Economic Rationality in the Early 18th Century London Stock Market, 37 ACTA 
SOCIOLOGICA 165 (1994). 
 12. This line of thinking has motivated the liberalization of markets in the former socialist world as a means to develop 
efficient markets even before privatization and other institutional reforms had been completed.  For a discussion of the sequence 
of privatization and market reforms, see Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property 
Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1996).  But see Justin Y. Lin, Viability, Economic Transition and Reflection on Neoclassical 
Economics, 58 KYKLOS 239 (2005) (arguing that non-viable firms will not function in a competitive market economy). 
 13. See, e.g., TEMASEK HOLDINGS, TEMASEK REPORT 2010:  MAKING A DIFFERENCE 5 (2010) (“Temasek Holdings is an 
investment company managed on commercial principles to create and deliver sustainable long-term value for our stakeholders.”), 
available at http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/pdf/temasek_review/TR2010.pdf; Mission and Principles, KUWAIT INV. AUTH., 
http://www.kia.gov.kw/En/About_KIA/Mission_Principles/ Pages/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (“[The Kuwait 
Investment Authority’s (“KIA”)] mission is to achieve long term investment returns on the financial reserves of the State of 
Kuwait . . . .”); CHINA INV. CORP., ANNUAL REP. 2010, at 1 (2010) (“[China Investment Corporation's] mission is to make long-
term investments to maximize risk adjusted financial returns for the benefit of the shareholder.”), available at http://www.china-
inv.cn/cicen/include/resources/CIC_2010_annualreport_en.pdf;  Guiding Principles, ABU DHABI INV. AUTH., 
http://www.adia.ae/en/About/Guiding_Principles.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2011) (“ADIA's decisions are based solely on its 
economic objectives of delivering sustained long-term financial returns.”). 
 14. See Eric Langland, Misplaced Fears Put to Rest:  Financial Crisis Reveals the True Motives of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 263 (Winter 2009). 
 15. Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds:  The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 111, 113–14 (2009). 
 Mercantilism Imperialist-
Capitalism 
Market 
Investor 
Passive outward 
investments 
X X  
Extraordinary 
outward 
investments 
X X X 
Dollar recycling X  X 
Revenues used to 
pacify domestic 
constituencies 
X X X 
Politicized 
domestic 
investments 
X X X 
 
One of the trademarks of SWF behavior over the past thirty years has been passive for-
eign direct investment.16  Certainly, SWFs have sought influence on the boards of some of their 
investment targets, but in the large majority of cases, SWF wealth is employed passively.  This is 
not consistent with the pursuit of a mercantilist agenda.  Passive investments in Western corpora-
tions allocate capital to corporations that maximize wealth at the company level; mercantilist 
SWFs would need either to successfully influence corporate boards to act in ways that benefit the 
sovereign sponsor at the expense of other investors (for which there is no evidence to date, and 
which is unlikely to occur in the future given strong penalties levied against directors who vio-
late the duty of loyalty),17 or to purchase large stakes in companies such that company-level 
wealth maximization results in de facto country-level wealth maximization.  Mercantilism, there-
fore, does not explain why SWFs predominantly invest passively.  Imperialist-capitalism, too, 
fails to provide an explanation for SWFs’ historical passive investment strategy.  Passive invest-
ment strategies simply do not fit with an “exploitative” agenda, nor do they serve to bend host-
country industrial policy to benefit the SWF sovereign sponsor.  The market-investor theory does 
explain SWFs’ passive investment strategy, as the cost advantages of a passive strategy are well-
documented. 
SWFs’ investments in Western financial institutions during the recent financial crisis 
were heavily publicized and caused great concern in many circles.18  None of the existing theo-
ries, however, offers an adequate explanation for why SWFs made these investments.  Almost 
uniformly, the investments included passivity clauses, specifying that the investments created 
“no special rights of ownership,” “no role in the management of the company,”  “no right to des-
 
 16. For a comprehensive study on past investment patterns of SWFs, see MONITOR GROUP, ASSESSING THE RISKS:  THE 
BEHAVIORS OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008). 
 17. The duty of loyalty is part of the fiduciary duties in U.S. corporate law.  However, other countries sanction conflicted 
transactions as well. For a comparative perspective, see Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in Transitional Civil 
Law Jurisdictions:  Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS:  CORPORATE 
LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 77 (Curtis Milhaupt ed., 2003). 
 18. Lawrence Summers, who later became economic advisor to the Obama administration, opined that the “logic of the 
capitalist system” of shareholders maximizing value is “far from obvious” in the case of SWF investments in foreign companies.  
Lawrence Summers, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, July 30, 2007, at 9. 
ignate a member . . . of the Board of Directors” or “[no] special governance rights.”19  This pas-
sivity, as noted above, is inconsistent with either a mercantilist or imperialist-capitalist agenda.  
Further, some of these investments (particularly those from Gulf states) were undertaken after 
U.S. officials visited political entities that sponsor SWFs to “persuade” them to contribute to the 
global bailout.20 Clearly, imperialist pressure was not being exerted by the SWFs looking to ex-
ploit Western markets; it was more likely exerted against them to force the recapitalization of 
Western-controlled financial institutions using SWF cash.  Therefore, the imperialist-capitalist 
theory cannot explain these extraordinary investments. 
Mercantilism also fails to provide an explanation for extraordinary investments during 
the financial crisis.  These recapitalizations were all made during a period of extreme uncer-
tainty:  conservative mercantilists would have disinvested from risky financial institutions fear-
ing the loss of capital, while aggressive risk-taking mercantilists would have demanded large re-
turns in exchange for their investments.  The evidence, however, shows that SWFs did not 
disinvest—instead, they increased their investments in risky Western financials during the cri-
sis.21  While some have since cut back their investments, they did so only after the urgency of the 
global financial crisis had subsided.22  They also did not extract disproportionate benefits:  they 
tended to act like cooperative players in the global economic governance system.  The converti-
ble bonds they purchased were preferred relative to those purchased by other equity investors, 
but were subordinated to later investments made by the U.S. government; also, most SWFs con-
verted their bonds to common shares early23—which is inconsistent with the country-level 
maximization story. 
SWF investments in Western financial institutions during the crisis cannot be easily ex-
plained as the actions of a rational market investor.  While some have argued that investing in 
vulnerable institutions and subsequent disinvestment in favor of more conservative instruments 
is perfectly consistent with the rational market investor theory,24 this ignores the particulars of 
the investments themselves.  When the SWFs invested in Western financial intermediaries, such 
as Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch (“Merrill”), Citigroup or UBS, share prices had already 
plummeted, and it was fairly clear among sophisticated investors that the bottom could not be 
identified because exposure to sub-prime mortgages was unknown.25  Other large players in the 
 
 19. Paul Rose, Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment in the Shadow of Regulation and Politics, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1207, 
1231–35 (2009). 
 20.  For a detailed account of one such bailout, see Katharina Pistor, Global Network Finance:  Institutional Innovation in 
the Global Financial Marketplace, 37 J. COMP. ECON. 552, 565 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 558.  For a more updated account, see Katharina Pistor, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Global Financial 
Governance, in SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (Karl Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2012). 
 22. Pistor, supra note 20, at 557. 
 23. Id. at 554, tbl.1. One example discussed is the additional capital injection China Investment Corporation gave Morgan 
Stanley to pay back the TARP money to the U.S. government. 
 24. Langland, supra note 14, at 265. 
 25. Indeed, the reason financial intermediaries turned to SWFs was that they were unable to secure sufficient funds to 
recapitalize at the time.  Note also that Barclays, a bank that had largely escaped the problems associated with asset-backed 
securities, tried to launch a public offer in the summer of 2008.  That offer was heavily undersubscribed.  Only commitments 
secured from sovereign investors (e.g., Temasek, China Development Bank and Qatar Investment Authority) to acquire the 
unsubscribed share ensured that the capital increase succeeded.  When Barclays needed more funds in the fall of 2008, it 
therefore went straight to sovereign investors.  For details, see generally Pistor, supra note 20. 
financial system were refusing to invest in the financials under any terms.26  In this environment, 
SWFs made huge investments concentrated in particular Western financials rather than spreading 
the investment across the industry (contrary to their normal investment patterns) and made the 
investment decisions extremely quickly.  For example, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
(“ADIA”) invested billions in Citigroup less than forty-eight hours after a visit from Robert 
Rubin—former U.S. Treasury Secretary and then-director at Citigroup.  Further, the fact that all 
SWFs incurred large losses as the result of these investments weighs against the market investor 
theory:  either they were easily misled “dumb money” or they had some other common reason to 
invest in Western financials beyond financial returns.  Given that SWFs have historically per-
formed well,27 we reject the “dumb money” explanation and instead conclude that the SWFs are 
not always market investors. 
Another important attribute of SWFs is that they recycle dollars from Eastern exporters to 
the West.28  This is consistent with an imperialist-capitalist theory but inconsistent with the other 
two theories.  Imperialist-capitalists should prefer equities in foreign markets to secure influence 
abroad and dollar recycling is consistent with this behavior.  Mercantilism, however, favors the 
accumulation of capital inside national borders, so sending large quantities of the international 
reserve currency back to the West would be anathema to mercantilist goals.  Market investors 
should invest in the highest-returning opportunities available and diversify against currency 
risks; SWFs, however, are heavily invested in dollar-denominated assets to the extent that they 
are overexposed to the dollar.29  Therefore, neither the mercantilism theory nor the market inves-
tor theory provides an explanation for why SWFs so consistently recycle dollars to the West. 
SWFs also use their funds to pacify domestic constituencies.  In some countries, new 
SWFs have been established to expand the institutional space such that potential rivals for politi-
cal authority are placated.30  In other countries, the proceeds of investments have been used to 
fund current government expenditures during times of crisis.31  None of the existing theories can 
explain this behavior.  Mercantilist institutions should maximize country-level benefits—not al-
locate benefits within the country to preferred groups.  The allocation of funds domestically is 
beyond the scope of imperialist-capitalist theory, but to the extent that these institutions should 
be seeking to maximize profit by taking advantage of opportunities outside the domestic econ-
 
 26. While SWFs do benefit from favorable tax treatment in the United States, see I.R.C. § 892 (2011), such that they should 
value U.S. equities more highly than either domestic investors or foreign private investors do, see Victor Fleischer, A Theory of 
Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 442 (2009), the complete lack of interest from non-sovereign sources suggests 
that a simple valuation gap was not the sole explanation. 
 27. It is difficult to get an accurate account of their performance because only a few SWFs make their performance data 
publicly available.  However, a careful assessment of the performance of SWFs prior to the global financial crisis shows that 
SWFs have highly diversified portfolios, invest in the long term and frequently invest in slightly riskier assets than the average 
institutional investor.  The assessment was conducted by Monitor, a Boston-based consulting group, and was based on 
transactions for which public information is available (i.e., when they invest in securities that are registered and reported on).  See 
MONITOR GROUP, supra note 16, at 33, 35–40, 56, 70. 
 28. See infra Part III.C (discussing the SWFs of Singapore). 
 29. This follows largely from the fact that they use foreign exchange earnings from oil exports and consumer product 
exports to finance their investments.  For details, see infra Part II (analyzing the origins and behavior of SWFs in case studies). 
 30. See, e.g., infra Part III.B (analyzing SWFs in Abu Dhabi). 
 31. During the Arab uprising of 2011, for example, Saudi Arabia launched a $35 billion program for domestic investment to 
appease its population.  See Abeer Allam, Saudi ‘Royal Gift’ Fails to Woo Activists, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2011), 
http://www.ft.com/ intl/cms/s/0/b02f1ffa-3f62-11e0-8e48-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Y2YES2sX. 
omy, the use of funds inside the SWF sovereign sponsor is inconsistent with expected behaviors.  
Lastly, the market investor theory does not explain this behavior either.  Market investors would 
neither allocate fund-management responsibilities based on political concerns nor draw down 
capital to fund current expenditures. 
Finally, SWFs’ domestic investment decisions are sometimes heavily politicized.  SWFs 
themselves admit that non-financial motivations influence domestic investment decisions.32  Less 
publicly, SWFs often take large minority stakes in domestic companies controlled by members 
of the existing elite and their allies; SWF-owned domestic financial institutions also provide ex-
tremely favorable lending facilities to the local merchant class on a “name-basis.”33  These ac-
tions prey on existing wealth and fail to maximize either country-level benefits or financial re-
turns accruing to the SWF. 
As shown above, none of the existing theories about SWF objectives and motivations ex-
plains the breadth of their documented behavior.  SWFs generally adopt a passive and diversified 
investment strategy in foreign markets, but they made extraordinary and highly risky investments 
in Western financial institutions during the financial crisis.34  They also recycle dollars to the 
West,35 make politicized domestic investments and use funds to pacify domestic constituencies.36  
Since none of the existing theories can explain all of these behaviors, a full understanding of 
SWFs requires a new theory about their institutional interests. 
B.  Autonomy Maximization 
We offer a new theory of SWF objectives and motivations.  We argue that SWFs act to 
maximize the domestic autonomy of the ruling elite in the sovereign sponsor.  As mentioned 
above, SWFs are government-owned and controlled and have no outside beneficiaries or liabili-
ties beyond the government itself, so they are responsive to the expressed interests and objectives 
of the government.  There are competing conceptions of what constitutes “governmental inter-
est” in a democratic society, but a discussion of public choice versus public interest politics is 
beyond the scope of this article.  In political entities without representative democracy or where 
the institutions of democracy are clearly subordinate to authoritarian rule, such as China, Singa-
 
 32. Economic diversification, creation of employment opportunities for nationals and economic development all play into 
domestic investments.  Even the lauded Norwegian Government Pension Fund explicitly invests according to a political agenda:  
it will not invest in weapons manufacturers, alcohol or tobacco producers, or firms that do not meet its labor relations standards.  
NORWEGIAN GOV’T PENSION FUND, GUIDELINES FOR THE OBSERVATION AND EXCLUSION OF COMPANIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT 
PENSION FUND GLOBAL’S INVESTMENT UNIVERSE § 2 (2010), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub /styrer-rad-
utvalg/ethics_council/ethical-guidelines.html?id=425277. 
 33. For an example of the consequences of loose lending policies like “name-lending,” see the massive write-downs by 
numerous SWF-controlled Middle Eastern banking institutions occasioned by the collapse of the Saad Group in 2009, Defaults:  
Islamic Finance in Uncharted Territory, REUTERS, Nov. 5, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/05/islamic-
defaults-idUSKLR44503820091105, and the subsequent backstopping of those banks by SWF sovereign sponsors’ deposits, 
particularly by increasing the level of government cash deposited in troubled banks.  See Government Deposits with Banks up 
Dh15bn, EMIRATES 24/7 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.emirates247.com/business/economy-finance/government-deposits-with-
banks-up-dh15bn-2010-09-28-1.296464. 
 34.  See discussion infra pp. 21, 31, 45, 53. 
 35.  See discussion infra p. 24. 
 36.  See infra pp. 19, 23, 26, 29, 31, 37 n.185, 43, 52. 
pore,37 Kuwait38 and Abu Dhabi, the government is comprised of ruling elites who are not di-
rectly accountable to the public in general; it is easy to see how “governmental interest” becomes 
tied to the personal interests of the ruling elite.  Indeed, the internal governance structures of the 
SWFs themselves ensure that SWF management is directly accountable to the ruling elite in each 
sovereign sponsor.39  Consequently, it is unsurprising that SWFs can be, and are, wielded to ad-
vance the interests of those elites.  First and foremost among these interests is the maintenance of 
their privileged position, which is characterized by autonomy within the sovereign sponsor.  We 
argue that SWF actions that are inconsistent with existing theories can be explained under our 
autonomy-maximization theory. 
 Mercantilism Imperialist-
Capitalism 
Market 
Investor 
Autonomy-
Maximization 
Passive outward 
investments 
X X   
Extraordinary 
outward 
investments 
X X X  
Dollar recycling X  X  
Revenues used 
to pacify 
domestic 
constituencies 
X X X  
Politicized 
domestic 
investments 
X X X  
 
A passive outward investment strategy is consistent with autonomy-maximizing behav-
ior.  First, passive investments are less likely to incur the ire of “more powerful” states—either in 
the form of protectionist regulation against foreign investment or more active interventions into 
SWF sovereign sponsors—ensuring that Western capital markets remain open to future SWF in-
vestment.  Further, insofar as generating wealth is conducive to increasing domestic autonomy,40 
the ability of a passive investment strategy to maximize wealth is consistent with autonomy-
maximization. 
The extraordinary investments made by SWFs during the financial crisis are also consis-
tent with the behavior of autonomy-maximizing institutions.  Among the elite in the Gulf States, 
there is an implicit understanding that the security umbrella provided by the United States is not 
completely free.  Therefore, in order to secure their continued control over the state in the long 
term (i.e., to protect their domestic autonomy), the ruling elite act to meet American demands 
 
 37.  While Singapore’s government structure is that of a parliamentary democracy, functionally it combines authoritarian 
and democratic institutions to form a hybrid system of governance sometimes referred to as “non-representative democracy.”   
 38.  In Kuwait, the Parliament is formally subordinate to the Emir. 
 39.  See infra notes 77–79, 138–141, 205–222, 264–276 and accompanying discussion. 
 40. Increased wealth provides the existing elites with a greater capacity to buy out potential rivals and reward their 
supporters, ensuring their continued autonomy in the domestic sphere. 
from time to time.41  Directing SWF investment toward the rescue of Western financial institu-
tions is quite consistent with protecting long-term autonomy in this sense.42  Further, if the SWFs 
had refused to assist in recapitalizing Western financial institutions, they might have been re-
jected as partners in the system of global economic governance, which would have reduced pol-
icy options for the elite in the future. 
Dollar recycling, too, is part of a commitment to Western states, but it is also critical for 
sustaining the domestic industrial policy choices that the elite in SWF sovereign sponsors have 
adopted.  For both export and commodity-funded SWFs, a failure to recycle dollars would re-
duce Western purchasing power and erode their own funding streams as export values decline.  
In the smaller SWF sovereign sponsors, a failure to recycle dollars may even result in Western-
backed regime change.43  Therefore, SWFs’ decisions to concentrate investments in dollar-
denominated assets is consistent with autonomy-maximization. 
Autonomy-maximization also explains the use of revenues to pacify domestic constituen-
cies.  The multiplication of SWFs in some sovereign sponsors provides potentially rivalrous ac-
tors within the sovereign sponsor with large capital pools of their own, aligning their interests 
with those of the ruling elite.  This improves the security of the ruling elite, increasing their 
autonomy, as remaining political rivals will have fewer allies.  Further, a drawdown on capital 
assets during times of crisis is consistent with autonomy-maximization; by spending money to 
meet government payrolls even during emergencies, the ruling elites are able to buy the contin-
ued loyalty of the population, improving their own ability to act freely after the end of the emer-
gency. 
Similarly, the politicized nature of domestic investments can be explained by autonomy-
maximization.  Favorable loans and large minority investments function to buy out potential po-
litical rivals, ensuring that they do not enter politics.  This ensures that existing elites have little 
competition for political power and increases the range of domestic policy choices that are avail-
able without causing political unrest.  Investing domestically in businesses that are labor-
intensive tends to reduce political opposition among the masses.  Taking a controlling stake in 
domestic financial institutions ensures that the existing elite will structure the economic devel-
opment of the sovereign sponsor (protecting their autonomy in this area of domestic policy). 
Overall, we argue SWF behavior can be explained by our autonomy-maximization the-
ory.  Our theory is related to but distinguishable from the sovereignty-maximization theory ad-
 
 41. Consider that even the 1970s oil embargo was, as Halliday puts it, “lifted before any of the original conditions for its 
being ended had been met:  not an inch of Palestinian soil had been returned.”  FRED HALLIDAY, ARABIA WITHOUT SULTANS 20–
21 (1974).  He goes on to describe how relations between the Gulf States and the West had moved past the posturing, and a 
compromise was apparently struck in which OPEC was allowed to maintain higher oil prices, but the oil-producing states of the 
Arabian Peninsula tacitly committed to investing in the West, purchasing significant amounts of western military equipment and 
paying for economic and military assistance from the United States.  Id. at 39.  For a detailed account of explicit bargaining 
between Arab tribal leaders and western powers during World War I and during the inter-war period, see generally ASKAR H. AL-
ENAZY, THE CREATION OF SAUDI ARABIA:  IBN SAUD AND BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY, 1914–1927 (2010). 
 42. Indeed, military exports to non-Chinese SWF sovereign sponsors increased after the recapitalizations.  See SIPRI Arms 
Transfer Database, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST., http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2011) (recipient register used to generate data). 
 43. In Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakbout’s obsession with hoarding gold and refusal to recycle the proceeds of oil exports back 
into the global economy led the British to provide support for the 1966 coup led by his brother, Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan.  
HALLIDAY, supra note 41, at 464. 
vanced by Dixon and Monk.44  While their theory, like ours, acknowledges that SWFs are tools 
that can be used to advance the interests of their sponsors,45 in our view they fall somewhat short 
in completing this chain of analysis by resting on the “state” as the sponsor.  We argue that the 
true stakeholders in the SWFs analyzed in this paper are the ruling elites in the sovereign spon-
sor, and that as such, it is the interests of these elites that SWFs advance.  To these elites, SWFs 
serve as a valuable tool for protecting their interests.  Limiting the interests of the ruling elite to 
state sovereignty, as would be necessary to justify a singular focus on sovereignty-maximization, 
appears to miss the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions to which these elites feel 
compelled to respond.  In fact, one can point to instances where the elites have been quite willing 
to compromise on their monopoly on the legitimate use of force within state borders (the key as-
pect of Westphalian sovereignty) but not control over SWFs.46 
III.  CASE STUDIES 
In this section we offer more detailed evidence in support of our theory drawing on the 
history and operation of SWFs from the Gulf States (Abu Dhabi and Kuwait) and the Far East 
(Singapore and China).  The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, an organization that tracks 
SWFs,47 currently estimates these entities’ SWFs account for more than half of the assets man-
aged by SWFs worldwide—or about $2.8 trillion.48  They also comprise four of the six top SWF 
sovereign sponsors as measured by fund size.49  Saudi Arabia is listed as sponsoring the third-
largest SWF, but the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority holds a substantial portion of its funds 
in low-risk assets, such as sovereign debt instruments.50  All four political entities selected are 
less than fully democratic51 and as such are representative of the majority of countries that have 
sponsored SWFs to date.  Indeed, the only fully democratic country among those sponsoring one 
of the ten largest SWFs is Norway.52  The political entities selected also exemplify the core fund-
ing mechanisms for SWFs:  the accumulation of vast foreign exchange reserves as a result of 
substantial trade surplus and/or commodity exports. 
 
 
 44. Dixon & Monk, supra note 2. 
 45.  Id. 
 46. The most obvious example is the establishment of both semi-permanent military bases and forward operating locations 
for the U.S. military in Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Singapore. See Military Bases Directory, MILITARY AVIATION—U.S AIR FORCE, 
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 47. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND INST., http:// www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
 48. Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ (last updated Dec. 2011). 
 49. Id. 
 50. SAMA Foreign Holdings, SWF INST., http://www.swfinstitute.org/swfs/sama-foreign-holdings/ (last visited Jan. 17, 
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 51. See supra notes 37, 38. 
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A.  Kuwait 
For hundreds of years, autonomy has been a concern for the rulers of Kuwait.  Situated as 
it is on the best natural harbor in the Persian Gulf and surrounded by Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, 
the implicit threat of invasion has always loomed large.53  Further, the royal position of the al 
Sabah was secured only by support from tribal leaders and the merchant class, which signifi-
cantly constrained royal privileges since both tribes and merchants in the historical Gulf were 
highly mobile.54  Whereas the al Sabah Emir once sent tributary payments to the Ottomans,55 
guaranteed the safety of British trade ships56 and privately bestowed gifts on tribal allies and 
merchants to secure royal autonomy,57 the modern bargain revolves around the allocation of oil 
revenues. 
The creation of a sovereign wealth fund in Kuwait served to increase the autonomy of the 
al Sabah family, as did the replacement of the Kuwait Investment Board with the Kuwait In-
vestment Office and its later supersession by the Kuwait Investment Authority (“KIA”).  The 
KIA’s subsequent actions reflect an objective of autonomy-maximization.  The drawdown on 
KIA funds during the Persian Gulf War, domestic investments in companies owned by the mer-
chant class and the investments in Citigroup and Merrill Lynch are all autonomy-maximizing ac-
tivities. 
The Kuwait Investment Authority is the primary sovereign wealth fund in Kuwait and 
manages both the Future Generations Fund (“FGF”) and General Revenue Fund (“GRF”) for the 
state.  Both the KIA and its funding are statutorily decreed.  Kuwait’s FGF was established by 
Kuwait’s Crown Prince and Finance Minister in Law Decree Number 106 of 1976, which per-
manently allocated ten percent of Kuwait’s annual general revenues to the FGF and prohibited 
any reduction of this percentage or withdrawal of funds from the account.58  In 1984, the KIA 
was created by another royal decree to manage the FGF and GRF.59  Both of these decisions 
were autonomy maximizing. 
The FGF was created in 1976, though the concept of a SWF in Kuwait can be traced back 
to 1953 when the Kuwait Investment Board (“KIB”) was established.60  The KIB was replaced 
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 54. If the Emir acted against the tribes or merchants, they would simply pack up and move to the territory of another Emir 
within the Gulf region—thereby depriving the Emir of tax revenues and military strength. 
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by the Kuwait Investment Office (“KIO”) after Kuwaiti independence in 1961.61  The KIO was 
created to manage surplus oil revenues, and the FGF was designed for the same function.62 
One might ask why Kuwait was extracting oil at levels that would create a budget sur-
plus, but this is outside the scope of this paper.63  Regardless of the motive, oil revenues must be 
allocated in some fashion.  It is likely that the fledgling nation of Kuwait would have happily 
gone along with the status quo (in which the Emir funded the state apparatus out of his personal 
coffers, bribed prominent merchants to stay out of politics and directly collected oil concession 
revenues from Western oil companies).  The creation of a sovereign wealth fund, however, 
maximized the autonomy of the al Sabah relative to other options. 
First, separating the private affairs of the ruling family and the public affairs of the state 
is a strong signaling mechanism in the formation of the modern nation-state.  If the al Sabah fam-
ily had continued to deposit oil revenues into their personal bank accounts, then the international 
community would not have seen the oil reserves as “sovereign.”  Consequently, nationalization 
of oil reserves would have been labeled more accurately as private theft and the recognition of 
the “statehood” of Kuwait, both internationally and domestically, might have been called into 
question, increasing the likelihood of foreign invasion or a democratic revolution.64 
Second, while the al Sabah could have separated the public and private spheres by trans-
ferring natural resource wealth to their subjects, it would not have been acceptable to the indi-
viduals within the royal family to transfer “their” oil wealth to the public at large.  It would es-
sentially have converted a royally-controlled and monopolized resource (oil) into a resource 
freely distributable among the nation (cash).  This likely would have shifted the domestic bal-
ance of power in Kuwait and Abu Dhabi toward the merchant class, which would have benefited 
dramatically from the increased demand for tradable goods.  Thus, the only option that protected 
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both the international security and domestic power of the royal family was to dedicate oil reve-
nues to the public sector. 
There was, however, a secondary decision to be made on the ratio of public spending to 
public savings.  It was immediately clear in Kuwait that very high savings rates were not likely 
to be accepted by opposition groups; at least some portion of oil revenues was needed to buy off 
the merchant class.  High public spending levels could have potentially increased buy-in to the 
national identity and loyalty to the al Sabah family if expansive government institutions were 
created to provide civil service positions, welfare payments and subsidized services to citizens.  
Indeed, in Kuwait and other Gulf states, large bureaucracies were created;65 however, as soon as 
public funds are spent, even through “loyalty-building” civil service structures and subsidies, 
royal control dissipates.  Further, oil reserves are not unlimited, so public spending is not a sus-
tainable model for ensuring the continuous provision of “loyalty-building” services and subsi-
dies. 
In contrast, public savings are still controlled by the state, which is dominated by the 
royal family and its agents.  Therefore, the royal influence and control created by public owner-
ship of oil is preserved when oil revenues are allocated to a SWF.  The KIA essentially trans-
forms a natural resource monopoly into an “effective monopoly on capital.”66  When Kuwait’s 
oil reserves eventually stop producing, the al Sabah will still have control over the most impor-
tant wealth-generating asset in the country.  This will leave the royal family financially autono-
mous; it will not have to rely on the merchant class or the general public for taxes, ensuring that 
these groups do not gain political leverage.  It will also ensure that the general public remains 
mostly dependent on the state for income.  Given investment income from the SWF, it will re-
main possible to continue paying citizens high wages to work for a few hours a day in the civil 
service and making direct cash subsidies.  Thus, the decision to create a SWF is consistent with 
the royal interest in protecting its position of financial and political privilege (i.e., its domestic 
autonomy). 
In choosing to create a SWF rather than simply sitting on a horde of dollars, Kuwait also 
satisfied Western powers that were concerned about their balance of payments.  As early as the 
1950s, the KIB played a significant role in the Eurodollar market,67 and investments by the KIB, 
KIO and KIA have been critical to managing the balance of payments between Kuwait and the 
West.68  Investing dollars abroad is fundamentally opposed to a mercantilist agenda69 but is quite 
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consistent with an autonomy-seeking goal.  Without a sovereign wealth fund to invest in oil sur-
pluses outside Kuwait, there likely would have been a severe backlash by the West against both 
Kuwait’s independence and its nationalization of the oil sector. 
The transformation of the KIB to the KIO, then to the FGF and eventually to the KIA 
also increased the autonomy of the al Sabah.  Regarding the transition between the KIB and KIO, 
it is clear that replacing the British-controlled KIB with the Kuwaiti-controlled KIO was essen-
tial to increasing Kuwait’s autonomy.  After gaining independence, seeking to control all of Ku-
wait’s accumulated surplus capital (rather than leaving it in a pseudo-trust administered by the 
British) was only natural.  The FGF was established in 1976 when the Kuwait Oil Company was 
nationalized;70 thus, dramatically increased revenues were expected to pour into the state coffers.  
By forming the FGF, the al Sabah deflected the inevitable pressure to increase public spending 
by dedicating half of all accumulated assets and ten percent of all future oil revenues to the sov-
ereign wealth fund.  This protected royal autonomy on public spending decisions.  It also legiti-
mized the decision to allocate oil revenues to the public sector by justifying the fund as being 
created to benefit future generations of Kuwaiti citizens, rather than simply “Kuwait.” 
The FGF was, however, mostly focused on investments outside of Kuwait.  When the 
1982 Souk al Manakh stock market crash threatened the survival of almost every large company 
in Kuwait, the government stepped in to purchase shares in the traded companies from the pub-
lic,71 and a new entity was needed to manage these companies.  Thus, the KIA was born.  While 
the KIA has since partially privatized or reduced its holdings in these companies,72 it is clear that 
it was formed to facilitate the transfer of funds that had been dedicated to international invest-
ments to a program designed to prop up the domestic economy (and stabilize the resulting politi-
cal unrest).  Housing both international and domestic investment management functions within 
the KIA ensured that potential future domestic crises could be averted more quietly.  Interest-
ingly, the legislation that created the KIA in 1982 prohibits the disclosure of any information 
about the organization or its performance to the public—at the penalty of up to three years in 
prison73—cementing the autonomy of the al Sabah to direct the KIA as they please. 
From the board of directors to its funding mechanisms, the institutional structure of the 
KIA functions to protect royal autonomy.  The KIA is led by Managing Director Bader 
Mohammad al Sa’ad, Executive Director of Operations and Administration Othman al Essa and 
Bader al Ajeel, Executive Director of General Reserves.74  It is overseen by a board of directors 
that is chaired by Mustafa Jassem al Shimali and also includes Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz al Sabah, 
Bader Mohammad al Sa’ad, Khalid al Rowaieh and Khalifa Musaad Hamada.75  Board member-
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ship is allocated on an ex officio basis to the Governor of the Central Bank, the Minister of Fi-
nance (who holds the Chairmanship), the undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance and custom-
arily to the Minister of Oil.  Additional seats are filled by prominent Kuwaitis with experience in 
investment management, at least three of whom must not concurrently hold a government posi-
tion.  The majority of the KIA’s directors must be from the private sector.76 
Thus, the KIA board of directors lacks the prominent royal membership that characterizes 
SWFs in Abu Dhabi.  However, this does not necessarily indicate any large degree of independ-
ence from the royal family.  The Governor of the Central Bank, Minister of Finance, Minister of 
Oil and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance are all appointed by the Emir and the Prime 
Minister (who is generally also the Crown Prince).  Even the requirement for a “majority-private 
sector” board is tempered by the appointment process, which the al Sabahs control; appointment 
of Board Members is executed through an Emiri decree.77 
Thus, despite a thin veneer of independence provided by the presence of non-royal direc-
tors, the fact that directors are appointed by the Emir and Prime Minister indicates that, in West-
ern parlance, the true shareholder in the KIA is the al Sabah family.78  Further, since there is no 
need to engage in any kind of proxy fight or to even call a general shareholder meeting to effect 
the will of this shareholder, the directors can be fired at any time.  Similarly, there is no “for 
cause” restriction on termination in the organizing documents of the KIA.79  Thus, the Emir 
maintains unqualified and instantaneous control over the KIA and the power to direct KIA in-
vestment choices if necessary. 
In Kuwait, funding to the KIA is statutorily decreed.  The GRF was created in 1960 with 
funding to be drawn from budget surpluses.80  Article 2 of Law 106 of 1976 dedicated fifty per-
cent of the GRF as seed capital to the FGF.  Article 1 additionally permanently allocated ten per-
cent of Kuwait’s annual general revenues to the FGF and prohibited any reduction of this per-
centage or withdrawal of funds from the account.81  This may seem to reduce royal control over 
funding; however, given that the Emir retains a veto over all new legislation, he has the power to 
propose legislation himself and can dissolve the Assembly, the future of Law 106 of 1976 effec-
tively rests in the hands of the Emir (and thus the al Sabah family).  Further, the Emir may 
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promulgate a royal decree pursuant to the law without Assembly approval.  Here, regulatory de-
crees are rather important, as the ban on “withdrawal of funds” has been narrowly interpreted in 
the past. 
This brings up one of the clearest examples of the KIA acting to maximize autonomy:  
the drawdown on FGF funds that occurred during the Persian Gulf War.  At the time of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, Kuwait’s Assembly had been dissolved for four years—so it could not pos-
sibly have approved any withdrawals from the FGF during the war.  However, accumulated sav-
ings from the FGF were used to provide short-term financing required by the heavy strain placed 
on the economy by the Gulf War.82  The al Sabah additionally paid millions to American public 
relations firms to drum up support for a U.S.-led invasion of Kuwait to expel Iraq’s army.83  Ad-
ditionally, after the allied coalition defeated the Iraqi forces and reinstalled the al Sabah family, 
the FGF was used to fund reconstruction efforts and provide direct subsidies to Kuwaiti citi-
zens.84  Granted, an invasion is an extraordinary circumstance, but Sheikh Jaber’s actions in util-
izing FGF funds were contrary to the express restrictions in Article 1 of Law 106 of 1976 be-
cause the Assembly did not approve them.  Furthermore, none of these actions were consistent 
with the KIA’s professed mission of “achiev[ing] long term investment returns on the financial 
reserves of the State of Kuwait.”85  They were, however, consistent with autonomy-
maximization. 
Using FGF funds to continue payments to the civil service was a remarkably astute way 
to ensure the loyalty of the bureaucracy during the exile.  Absent these payments, support for the 
al Sabah regime could easily have waned in favor of establishing a more powerful legislature 
since tensions had been running high prior to the invasion.  Similarly, buying up the debt of Ku-
waiti citizens (and eventually forgiving most of it) ensured that citizens would not lose their 
homes due to non-payment of their obligations.  While an argument could be made that using 
FGF funds to pay for the reconstruction of Kuwait’s oil infrastructure was consistent with 
achieving long-term investment returns (because oil production is Kuwait’s most profitable in-
vestment86), given the availability of extensive international loans at the time, Kuwait probably 
could have borrowed money at rates below the returns on its international portfolio.  Spending 
from the FGF, however, emphasized the competence (and “generosity”) of the al Sabahs, while 
borrowing from the international community would have been a signal of weakness to the Ku-
waiti population.  As a consequence of using FGF funds, the legitimacy of the al Sabahs was 
protected, thereby securing their domestic autonomy in the long term. 
Domestically, the KIA invests in a manner that effectively buys out the political ambi-
tions of the merchant class.  The KIA has a history of investing in the businesses of prominent 
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merchant families within Kuwait.  While this kind of investment would not normally reflect a 
non-financial motive, it does suggest autonomy-maximization in the Kuwaiti context.  As dis-
cussed earlier, the merchant class is a potential rival for political power in Kuwait.  As early as 
1950, Sheikh Abdullah al Sabah “bought out” the political ambitions of the merchant class by 
granting preferential monopolies, dealerships, extending personal loans and withdrawing the al 
Sabah family from Kuwaiti commercial activity.87  The continued allocation of oil revenues to 
the merchant class through KIA’s domestic investment reflects the ongoing arrangement be-
tween the al Sabahs and Kuwait’s merchants:  KIA funds are invested, few demands are made 
for dividends (as long as the family remains pliant) and shares are rarely sold.  When this politi-
cized domestic investment activity slowed during the 1980s as a result of depressed oil prices, 
Kuwait’s merchants re-entered the political scene.  In 1989, prominent members of the merchant 
class began meeting in secret with members of the dissolved Assembly—worrying the al Sabahs 
enough that the Emir established a replacement for the Assembly (though the crisis was ulti-
mately rendered moot by the Iraqi invasion).88  Therefore, it is clear that KIA’s domestic invest-
ment strategy increases the autonomy of the al Sabah family by preventing the emergence of se-
rious challengers to royal legitimacy. 
In the international arena, the KIA has generally followed a conservative strategy by in-
vesting in a diversified portfolio while remaining below reporting requirements in most of its in-
vestments.  To be sure, most of its international investments are profit-driven.  This is not, how-
ever, inconsistent with autonomy-maximization, as building wealth increases the range of policy 
options available to the al Sabah family and preserves their ability to continue making these pol-
icy decisions after Kuwait’s oil reserves are eventually depleted. 
On the subject of investment levels themselves, prior to its Citigroup investment, the KIA 
held stakes larger than 5% in only three publicly traded Western corporations:  approximately a 
24% stake in Swiss hotelier Victoria Jungfrau Collection AG and approximately an 8% stake in 
GEA AG,89 as well as a 5.3% share in Daimler AG.90  Remaining below the reporting threshold 
defined in domestic securities legislation is quite consistent with autonomy-maximization, as it 
allows SWFs to avoid public scrutiny.91  First, the KIA is well aware of the political firestorm 
that could result if its international investments were publicized.  When British Petroleum’s IPO 
floundered in 1987, the KIA purchased a substantial stake in the company, acquiring 21.6% by 
March 1988, only to be ordered by the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission to divest 
down to 9.9%.92  The British government also pressured the KIA to sell off even more, which it 
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did, leaving the KIA with the estimated 1.75% of BP that it still holds today.93  Second, crossing 
key investment thresholds subjects even SWFs to an increased regulatory burden in Western 
countries.  By remaining below these thresholds, the KIA ensures that the additional duties that 
these regimes impose do not restrain its investment.  Finally, keeping investment levels below 
these reporting thresholds ensures that the CFIUS will not review the KIA’s investments, as only 
“control” transactions are subject to review.94  Therefore, by avoiding large investments and ac-
tivist interventions in the management of companies, the KIA preserves its ability to invest in a 
wider array of businesses while avoiding regulatory scrutiny and protectionist counter-
measures—thereby maximizing its autonomy in financial markets. 
The KIA’s extraordinary investments in Western financial institutions during December 
2007 and January 2008 also reflect autonomy-maximizing behavior.  While Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers had not yet collapsed, it was fairly clear that subprime mortgages posed a sub-
stantial risk to Western financial institutions.  In that environment, the KIA purchased three bil-
lion dollars95 in Citigroup convertible preferred shares bearing 7% interest and convertible at a 
20% premium to the then-current share price.96  At the time, the federal overnight rate was about 
4.25%,97 so the preferred shares presumably would yield a 2.75% premium; however, as pre-
ferred shares, the securities were not principal protected.  It is hard to understand why the KIA 
would have put such a large sum at risk when the decline in Citigroup’s share price showed no 
signs of slowing and had already reduced the company’s valuation by 37% in the last six months, 
with no end in sight.  Simply put, something else must have been going on.98 
The KIA’s investment into Merrill Lynch was on similar terms:  two billion dollars for 
convertible preferred shares bearing nine percent interest, although these had a mandatory con-
version feature after 2.75 years.99  Similarly to the Citigroup investment, this was a large risk to 
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undertake given the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of exposure to mortgage-backed se-
curities and the valuation of those securities.  Although the conversion price was not initially dis-
closed, given that Merrill Lynch was trading at fifty-four dollars per share at the time, and based 
on comparisons with the publicly disclosed investment in similar securities by the New Jersey 
Investment Council, the KIA’s preferred shares were probably supposed to convert to two per-
cent of Merrill’s common stock.  Again, these shares were not principal protected, so the large 
risk taken by the KIA does not make much intuitive sense.100  Either the KIA was irrational, or 
there was something else going on in the transaction. 
The investments into Citigroup and Merrill Lynch involved the KIA taking on substantial 
downside risks to stabilize two Western financial institutions in return for less-than-certain re-
turns.  By making these investments so quickly in a troubled market, the KIA improved Kuwait’s 
reputation as a trustworthy and responsible player in the global financial system.  This reputa-
tional boost should improve the KIA’s autonomy relative to Western financial regulators in the 
future, as the KIA should be seen as less threatening.  It also can be viewed as part of the security 
bargain between the United States and Kuwait.  In the two years following these investments, 
U.S. firms have announced weapons sales and military base construction projects in Kuwait val-
ued at over $1.9 billion.101  The security guarantee provided by the United States is not unique.  
The al Sabahs secured Ottoman support by sending tributary payments,102 and British protection 
from the 1930s through the 1960s was secured by the provision of access to Kuwaiti oil fields.103  
In either case, the result of the KIA’s investments in Western financial firms during the crisis 
was an increase in autonomy. 
The KIA was also deeply involved in bailing out the domestic Kuwaiti financial and in-
dustrial sectors.  Law Decree No. 2 of 2009, entitled “Enhancing the State Economic Security,” 
authorized the KIA to recapitalize domestic banks through convertible bonds, shares or sukuk 
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bonds,104 and extend subordinated loans to, or purchase convertible bonds, sukuks or preferred 
shares in, domestic businesses in the productive sector.105  It also authorized the Central Bank of 
Kuwait to guarantee domestic banks’ investment portfolios and real estate debt obligations,106 
and to guarantee up to fifty percent of new107 or refinanced108 commercial loans made to domes-
tic businesses in the productive sector. 
Pursuant to this law, the KIA intervened dramatically in the domestic private sector.  In 
April of 2009, the KIA made a $1.4 billion investment into companies traded on the Kuwait 
Stock Exchange (“KSE”) to fight off a regional stock market rout.109  This is not an investment 
that a profit-maximizing fund would make—higher profits could be made by investing after a 
large run on the market than by stabilizing it—nor would a mercantilist institution make the in-
vestment, as it puts precious capital at risk.  Similarly, investing domestically does not serve im-
perialist motives. 
The investment was, however, a strong move toward protecting the autonomy of the rul-
ing elite.  During the previous bull market on the KSE, Kuwaiti citizens invested heavily into 
KSE-traded companies.  If their investments had collapsed, political turmoil might have fol-
lowed, especially since the KIA had already acted to stabilize Western financial institutions.  By 
stabilizing the KSE, the KIA rescued panicked small investors and stabilized the value of large 
merchant-controlled companies, thereby preventing the spread of political unrest and ensuring 
the continued autonomy of the ruling elite.  The level of private financing provided under Law 
Decree No. 2 of 2009 is unknown, but it is almost certain that the KIA purchased convertible 
bonds and sukuks on terms favorable to equity holders.  These mechanisms provided another 
protection against political unrest—this time by pacifying the owners of privately held compa-
nies (which are generally members of prominent merchant families or tribal leaders).  There 
were even rumors that KIA bailout funds were being selectively directed to the companies 
owned by the al Sabahs’ political allies—a charge that the KIA denied,110 but the truth of which 
would be consistent with previous KIA investment behavior. 
In summary, the formation of the KIA and its predecessor SWFs in Kuwait were auton-
omy-maximizing events aimed at ensuring international recognition of Kuwait’s statehood and 
the al Sabah family as its legitimate rulers.  In light of the geopolitical context in which Kuwait 
finds itself, the general strategy of investing internationally for profit in a mostly passive fashion 
furthers the same goal.  By quietly recycling foreign exchange earnings from oil exports through 
the KIA, Kuwait essentially cements the implicit security bargain it has with the United States.  
Additionally, several extraordinary events support our argument that the KIA serves primarily 
autonomy-maximizing goals.  First, the drawdown on KIA assets during the Persian Gulf War 
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demonstrates that Kuwait’s elite have used KIA accounts as a backup source of funds to prevent 
any disruption in payments to important allies (both domestic and international) on whom they 
rely for security and legitimacy—one that remains viable even if access to oil revenues has been 
compromised.  Second, politicized domestic investments demonstrate how KIA investments 
have been used to pay off potential challengers to the ruling elite.  Furthermore, the KIA’s large 
investments into Citigroup and Merrill Lynch during the financial crisis illustrate how SWF as-
sets are used to meet Kuwait’s political obligations during times of international turmoil.  Lastly, 
the bailout of the Kuwaiti economy in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis reinforces this theme:  the 
KIA is used to deflect calls for political autonomy, revealing autonomy-maximizing motives. 
B.  Abu Dhabi 
Much of the story in Abu Dhabi mirrors that in Kuwait.  The creation of ADIA and other 
Abu Dhabi SWFs, their general investment strategy and their extraordinary actions all reflect 
autonomy-maximizing behavior.  It is useful, however, to delve into the particulars.  First, Abu 
Dhabi’s SWFs exist at a sub-national level, which presents an interesting story of domestic 
autonomy-maximization relative to other ruling Emirati families.  Second, the evolution of SWFs 
in Abu Dhabi is peculiarly linked to issues of succession and royal power sharing.  Finally, the 
“grand bargain” with the merchant class is especially obvious in the context of the domestic 
banking sector. 
In Abu Dhabi, four distinct sovereign wealth funds coexist, the oldest of which, ADIA, 
dates back to 1976 and the newest of which, Mubadala, was created in 2002.  The same general 
argument applies to the creation of SWFs to manage oil revenues in Abu Dhabi as in Kuwait.  
Allocating revenues to a public-sector savings vehicle transforms the royal family’s monopoly 
on oil reserves into a virtual monopoly on capital.  Thus, the creation of a SWF maximizes royal 
autonomy comparatively more than distributing revenues to the private sector, keeping revenues 
in private bank accounts or allocating them more substantially toward public spending. 
The creation of a SWF also maximizes autonomy relative to Western powers.  As men-
tioned in the Kuwait case study above, Western powers have been concerned about the balance 
of payments resulting from oil sales since the Gulf States first assumed any degree of control 
over the revenues.  In Abu Dhabi in particular, the consequences of refusing to recycle currency 
to the West are vividly apparent.  When the former Emir Sheikh Shakhbout bin Sultan ruled over 
Abu Dhabi, he pursued an aggressively mercantilist strategy:  “he insisted on keeping his re-
serves in gold and on inspecting them in the bank each week” and “hid himself on his yacht in 
Abu Dhabi harbour, where he kept his sheep and his gold bars.”111  In 1966, development spend-
ing was only £1.75 million out of over £200 million in revenues,112 creating a large imbalance in 
international payments.  Consequently, he was deposed by his brother Zayed, who relied on Brit-
ish backing and the support of credibly neutral members of the al Nahyan family.  Understanda-
bly, the subsequent rulers in Abu Dhabi have been careful to maintain their implicit obligations 
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to recycle currency to the West in order to prevent Western interventions in the domestic politi-
cal realm—thereby protecting the al Nahyan family’s domestic autonomy. 
Another prominent attribute of the SWFs in Abu Dhabi is that they are controlled at the 
sub-national level.  This can be explained as a consequence of the circumstances surrounding the 
creation of the U.A.E., but it also maximizes the autonomy of the al Nahyan family within the 
national context.  The formation of the U.A.E. was an ambitious political endeavor that was par-
ticularly precarious because it sought to subordinate the previously sovereign powers of seven 
emirates ruled by six families to a national superstructure.  Given that Abu Dhabi possessed the 
vast majority of oil reserves in the U.A.E. but only a minority of the population, Sheikh Zayed al 
Nahyan would have insisted on reserving control of oil deposits to the emirate in which they 
were located.113  Indeed, Article 23 of the U.A.E. constitution provides that “the natural re-
sources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered to be the public property of that Emir-
ate.”114  The inclusion of “wealth” in this constitutional provision indicates that retaining sub-
national autonomy over the use of oil revenues was critically important to the political bargain 
that created the U.A.E.  By reserving oil revenues to the individual emirates, the U.A.E. Consti-
tution ensured that SWFs would be owned, controlled and administered at the sub-national level.  
This in turn ensured that investment and spending decisions remained a local matter, thereby 
maximizing the autonomy of Abu Dhabi (and thus the al Nahyan family). 
Other emirates, particularly Dubai, have tried to establish independent wealth-generating 
assets to increase their ability to resist the influence of Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues in the federal 
political system.  While Dubai’s rapid expansion has been impressive, particularly in its evolu-
tion into a global transshipment and distribution center, its aggressive leveraging strategy put its 
progress in jeopardy when the financial crisis hit.  When it looked like Dubai’s repayment obli-
gations on a large sukuk issued by Nakheel could not be met, a bailout from Abu Dhabi seemed 
likely—but was not assured.  While Abu Dhabi reversed from its initial position that it would not 
backstop Dubai’s debt, the subtext was that Dubai’s ambitions on influence within the federal 
system would be curtailed.  Indeed, in January of 2010, the Burj Dubai—which was supposed to 
be a symbol of Dubai’s achievement—was renamed the Burj Khalifah, in honor of Sheikh Khali-
fah bin Zayed al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi.115  The world’s tallest tower now stands in the middle of 
Dubai as a reminder that it is Abu Dhabi, and thus the al Nahyan family, that has control and 
autonomy within the U.A.E.116 
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and could have co-opted Abu Dhabi’s resources through the Executive Council of the U.A.E. if ownership had not been reserved 
to the sub-national political units.  Since it would have been difficult for the smaller, poorer emirates to offer concessions to the al 
Nahyans in exchange for truly national ownership of oil, it is little wonder that ownership was reserved to the individual emirates. 
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 115. See Andy Sambidge & Andrew White, World's tallest tower hits 828m, renamed Burj Khalifa, ARABIANBUSINESS.COM 
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tallest building opens in Dubai, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8439618.stm. 
 116. The bailout of Dubai’s debt was funded by $10 billion in bond purchases by the U.A.E. Central Bank (which is 
overwhelmingly funded by Abu Dhabi) and $10 billion in bond purchases made directly by the government of Abu Dhabi; these 
Another unique feature in the history of SWFs in Abu Dhabi is the proliferation of differ-
ent funds.  The creation of these new funds could probably be explained in a number of ways, 
such as increasing efficiency through specialization, but it is probably best understood through 
the lens of royal succession.117  Between 1909 and 1928, a series of fratricides and early deaths 
plunged Abu Dhabi’s political system into chaos.  It was only the intervention of the eldest son 
of Sheikh Zayed the Great,118 Khalifah bin Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan (who had refused the po-
sition of Emir several times), that created the stability necessary to install Shakbout bin Sultan 
bin Zayed al Nahyan as Emir for thirty-eight years.  Khalifah’s sons, collectively known as the 
Bani Khalifa, were also critical in the coup that deposed Shakbout in favor of his younger 
brother Zayed in 1966.  In light of this legacy of fratricide and instability, the proliferation of 
SWFs in Abu Dhabi is best understood as the expansion of institutional space.  By opening new 
spaces within a controlled area of the economy in which non-ruling royals may pursue their am-
bitions, the creation of new SWFs lowers the stakes in royal succession and creates a common 
interest among royals in preserving the status quo—thereby reducing the likelihood of intra-
familial fractures and increasing the autonomy of the royal family. 
After ADIA was established in 1976, Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan quickly created the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Company (“ADIC”) in 1977 to focus on domestic investments.  The ADIC 
was initially almost wholly owned by ADIA. Setting up the ADIC as a virtual subsidiary reflects 
a distinct decision by Sheikh Zayed al Nahyan to separate domestic and foreign investment deci-
sion-making.  This decision expanded the political space available to accommodate allies and po-
tential rivals.  By placing different factions of the royal family on the board of directors at each 
SWF, the Emir could reward his allies and pacify potential rivals without allowing any individ-
ual to accumulate enough power to pose a serious political threat.  For instance, directors and of-
ficers at the domestically-focused ADIC could presumably gain considerable domestic influence 
in the merchant and industrial communities but could not access the larger assets at the parent-
fund level.  On the opposite side, ADIA directors and officers control massive amounts of capital 
but do not interact with the local business community on a daily basis.  Therefore, separating 
domestic and international investment functions decreased the likelihood of conflicts within the 
royal family or political unrest from tribal allies.  Both objectives are consistent with autonomy-
maximization. 
In 1984, Sheikh Zayed established the International Petroleum Investment Company 
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(“IPIC”) as a fifty-fifty joint venture between ADIA and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(“ADNOC”), giving it a mandate to focus on investments in the petrochemical sector.119  The 
IPIC was essentially a forum in which ADNOC and ADIA could arrive at a consensus on in-
vestments in the petroleum sector after balancing financial returns against Abu Dhabi’s strategic 
needs related to oil.120  ADIA representatives on the IPIC board typically judged the financial 
merits of acquisitions, while ADNOC officials reviewed their strategic value to Abu Dhabi’s oil 
sector.121  Still, the Supreme Petroleum Council retained the ultimate decision-making authority 
over IPIC investments122 to ensure that they conformed to the IPIC’s mandate of securing high-
quality upstream services and downstream markets for Abu Dhabi’s primary export.123  The crea-
tion of the IPIC created additional institutional space within the realm of SWFs, allowing Sheikh 
Zayed to accommodate the political ambitions of additional family members and political allies. 
Initially, Sheikh Zayed delegated supervisory roles at the SWFs, ADNOC, the diwan 
(Council of State) and many ministries to his Bani Khalifa allies, thereby shoring up support 
against loyalists to the deposed Sheikh Shakbout and increasing Sheikh Zayed’s policy-making 
autonomy in other areas.  As the senior members of the Bani Khalifah grew older and his own 
sons came of age, Sheikh Zayed shifted control of the SWFs and government agencies to his 
own sons to satisfy their political ambitions and smooth the way for an eventual succession.  
Prior to his death, Sheikh Zayed had placed ADIA under the influence of a younger son, Ahmed 
(generally seen as being allied with Khalifa bin Zayed and not a succession challenger), while re-
taining the chairmanship for himself; IPIC was the province of Mansour (another younger son), 
and ADIC was placed under the control of key tribal allies.  However, none of these appointees 
were politically ambitious.  Sheikh Zayed’s eldest son, and then-Crown Prince, Khalifa, was ap-
pointed to lead the Supreme Petroleum Council and Executive Council.  Mohammed was given a 
leadership position in the United Defense Forces, the U.A.E. military.124 
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan’s death in 2004 prompted the first succession in Abu 
Dhabi since independence.  It also marked the first uncontested transfer of power since the death 
of Zayed the Great in 1909.  Despite his position as Crown Prince, it was not certain that Khalifa 
would succeed to his father’s position over Mohammed, because Mohammed’s political status 
had grown tremendously due to his position as the eldest brother within the Bani Fatima.125  
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While Khalifa had secured the support of the Bani Khalifa, the tribal hinterland and most of his 
brothers outside the Bani Fatima, Mohammed could have made the succession difficult.  Conse-
quently, upon his appointment as Emir, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan immediately en-
acted measures designed to reward his supporters and mollify the Bani Fatima. 
Khalifa first upheld the accession of Mohammed as Crown Prince126 and appointed him 
as Chairman of the Abu Dhabi municipal government.127  He then decreed the creation of 
Mubadala (another SWF) in 2002,128 transferred ADIA’s interest in IPIC to ADNOC, spun off 
the Abu Dhabi Investment Council (“ADICU”) from ADIA and transferred ADIA’s domestic as-
sets (including ADIC, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (“NBAD”) and the Abu Dhabi Commer-
cial Bank (“ADCB”)) to the newly independent ADICU.129  The historical, transitional and cur-
rent institutional structure of Abu Dhabi’s SWFs is shown in the Annex, Figure 1. 
The dramatic 2004 reorganization not only decentralized control of Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, 
but also divided control between powerful political players within the Emirate.  Mubadala’s very 
existence is owed to Sheikh Mohammed’s political influence.  Without a fund of his own, Mo-
hammed would have been more likely to make a serious challenge to the succession rather than 
to rally behind Khalifa.  Similarly, Mansour gained increased control over IPIC after ADIA’s 
shares were transferred to ADNOC.  Without the supervisory role that ADIA-aligned directors 
had played in IPIC, Mansour would have had greater freedom to pursue investments of his own 
choosing.  Operational control of the new ADICU has been effectively delegated to al Nahyan 
tribal allies (the al Kindi and al Suwaidi).130 
The consequences of separating the SWFs are not merely theoretical.  ADICU expanded 
its original “domestic” mandate to become an international investment vehicle.131  In buying up 
New York’s Chrysler building in 2008,132 ADICU seems to be treading into territory tradition-
ally covered by ADIA.  Financially speaking, there is little reason that ADICU should have been 
investing in New York real estate.  The Council’s mandate was domestic, its employees have fo-
cused on domestic investing for some forty years and if the investment opportunity was attrac-
tive, there is no reason that ADIA would not be the appropriate vehicle.  The absence of any re-
sponse by ADICU’s al Nahyan directors suggests that a distinct decision has been made to 
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accept the actions of their tribal allies at the helm of ADICU—at least as long as they remain pli-
ant allies. 
In a similar fashion, IPIC, moving far beyond its “petrochemical” mandate under Man-
sour’s direction, acquired a 16.3% stake in Barclays in 2008 through a deal that sidestepped the 
supervision of Sheikh Khalifa and was probably brokered through Mansour’s Dubai connec-
tions.133  The transaction was rather murky, as it was reported that Mansour agreed to the deal in 
both a personal capacity and as the chairman of the IPIC board.  Although much publicity ac-
companied IPIC’s subsequent disinvestment in June 2009, IPIC retained a 5% stake in Bar-
clays.134  Apparently, IPIC is still in the banking business.  The decision to allow Mansour to 
push for these kinds of non-petrochemical investments seems to be a conciliatory measure de-
signed to mitigate any friction with Khalifa.135 
The very creation of Mubadala seems to be designed to pacify Mohammed bin Zayed by 
allowing him to pursue his own vision for developing Abu Dhabi, which tends to be more ag-
gressive and modernizing than that of Khalifa or their father Zayed.  Thus, Mohammed’s 
Mubadala has moved aggressively to take significant stakes in high-profile foreign companies 
(e.g., Rolls-Royce, AMD Computing, the Carlyle Group and Ferrari, among others).  Mubadala 
also invests domestically in numerous firms in various sectors, including health services, aero-
space and large-scale aluminum smelting.136  Perhaps most surprisingly, however, Mubadala has 
acquired large stakes in some domestic petroleum services companies and has even bought sig-
nificant stakes in oil blocs around the world through its wholly owned subsidiary, Liwa En-
ergy.137  It is clear that Mubadala’s mandate is not geographically limited, nor is it limited by 
sector (as it has moved into IPIC’s traditional realm).  There seems to be little financial rationale 
behind creating an entire new SWF rather than creating a fund for aggressive investments under 
ADIA.  Politically, however, creating space for Mohammed to pursue his own aims was impor-
tant to ensuring an uncontested succession for Khalifa. 
Overall, the proliferation of multiple SWFs in Abu Dhabi has increased the institutional 
space available for members of the royal family, increasing their individual autonomy and creat-
ing a more stable political environment in which dissent is less likely (thereby increasing Sheikh 
Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan’s autonomy as Emir in a broader sense).  This strategy was pursued 
by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan and was expanded during the succession that led to his son Khalifah 
bin Zayed bin Sultan ascending to the position of Emir. 
It is equally important to recognize that the al Nahyan family retains control over the 
management of each SWF in Abu Dhabi.  At ADIA, the board of directors is composed of six 
royal family members and four close tribal allies.138  As the largest of Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, it is 
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considered the third most powerful institution in Abu Dhabi.  Accordingly, the Emir directly 
holds the position of Chairman and his younger brother Ahmed (who is not a political rival in 
any sense) directly manages the operations of ADIA through his position as managing director.  
At ADICU, while the Executive Council and management positions are dominated by tribal al-
lies rather than the al Nahyans, five of eight board seats are held by the al Nahyan family, ensur-
ing ultimate royal control.139  At IPIC, non-royals hold the majority of board seats, but the fund 
is now a wholly owned subsidiary of ADNOC, thereby placing it under ultimate royal control.  
In practice, IPIC is dominated by Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, even though the manag-
ing director is not a member of the al Nahyan family.  Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan 
is the chairman of the board at Mubadala; he has surrounded himself with allies who have 
worked alongside him for decades and technocrats.140  In all of these SWFs, the al Nahyan fam-
ily controls the nomination and removal processes for directors—ensuring that when push comes 
to shove, these SWFs will serve the interests of the royal family and thus ensure its autonomy 
from political competition at home and abroad. 
In addition to maintaining royal control over the SWFs’ boards of directors, the auton-
omy of the royal family is assured through SWF funding mechanisms.  For Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, 
it is difficult to confirm exactly when and how funding decisions are made with respect to state 
revenue stream allocation, as there is no controlling public law like that in Kuwait.  It is, how-
ever, fairly certain that the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC) must clear all decisions on 
changes in the allocation of oil revenues.  Since the chair of the SPC is the Emir, and al Nahyans 
and Emiri-appointed tribal allies hold the other seats, it is apparent that funding remains a fail-
safe tool to ensure SWF loyalty to the royal family. 
Beyond the creation and institutional structures of Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, their investment 
decisions also reflect an autonomy-maximizing objective.  In the international sphere, ADIA’s 
trademark has been its tendency to purchase small stakes in companies below the threshold for 
mandatory reporting requirements.  ADIA’s head of strategy Jean-Paul Villain, a Frenchman 
who has held top positions at ADIA for most of the past two decades, noted that keeping ADIA’s 
stake below this threshold eliminates the headaches associated with being a named share-
holder.141  As noted in the Kuwait case study above, this strategy is autonomy-maximizing be-
cause it maximizes the number of investment opportunities that ADIA can pursue without trig-
gering a political backlash.  As in the case of the KIA, Abu Dhabi’s SWFs do not follow this 
“small investment” strategy inside the Middle East (including inside Abu Dhabi itself) where po-
litical reactions are less likely.  For instance, ADIA holds large shares in the Arab Banking Cor-
poration, the Arab International Bank, U.A.E.’s Union Cement Company, Qatar Telecom and 
Egypt’s EFG Hermes Holding.142  Similarly, ADIA does not nominate directors for Western 
companies but does nominate and elect directors onto the boards of Middle Eastern companies.  
It is therefore apparent that ADIA’s general strategy is autonomy-maximizing. 
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ADIA’s extraordinary investment in Citigroup can also best be explained as autonomy-
maximizing.  First, the investment fits with ADIA’s aversion to exceeding reporting require-
ments:  the convertible bonds convert to no more than 4.9% of Citigroup Inc.’s equity.143  It was 
not, however, secretive.  This is in large part because the investment was not made through the 
normal Villain-led strategy-setting and opportunity-identifying regime.  In this transaction, for-
mer Treasury Secretary and Citigroup’s then-Chairman Robert Rubin (whose political linkages 
to the American government were not unnoticed) traveled to Abu Dhabi and met and shook 
hands with Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed.  Two days later, the 
money was wired to a Citigroup account.144  This transaction’s departure from almost all of 
ADIA’s traditional investing patterns makes it look suspiciously like a political investment—one 
that is, in fact, autonomy-maximizing.  By supporting the recapitalization of Citigroup, ADIA 
conveyed that it is a cooperative player within the system of global economic governance,145 
which should open more investment opportunities in the future.  Despite its size and political na-
ture, nothing in the deal suggests that it was mercantilist; ADIA acquired only convertible debt 
and remained a passive investor.  As in Kuwait, large arms sales to the U.A.E. were announced 
in 2009 through 2010, which may have been part of the implicit political bargain in the transac-
tion. 
Outside of ADIA, Abu Dhabi’s SWFs are more aggressive.  ADICU invests primarily 
within Abu Dhabi and is not averse to taking large stakes in companies targeted for investment.  
ADICU owns majority shares in the NBAD,146 the ADCB,147 Union National Bank148 and Al 
Hilal Bank,149 and large stakes in numerous other domestic companies.150 The majority stakes in 
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domestic banks are particularly relevant because they guarantee that the domestic financial sector 
is ultimately responsible to the state (and thus to the al Nahyan family).  Through these interme-
diary financial institutions, it is possible to carefully manage the development of Abu Dhabi’s 
economy, ensuring that political allies are more easily able to access credit markets.  The scandal 
involving the Saad Group and Algosaibi & Brothers Company is illustrative of the kind of name-
based lending that occurs on a regular basis throughout the Middle East.151  Further, the provi-
sion of mortgage loans based on the reputation of the owner of the target property, rather than the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, was very common.152  Overall, Abu Dhabi has used the sub-
sidiaries of its SWFs to provide easy credit and cash payments to domestic political allies.  This 
behavior is autonomy-maximizing because it incentivizes loyalty to the royal family, thereby in-
creasing the range of actions that the royal family can undertake without leading to political re-
sistance. 
In a similar vein, IPIC has traditionally made large investments in the petrochemicals sec-
tor.153  This strategy is consistent with autonomy-maximization.  By purchasing large or control-
ling stakes in downstream petrochemical companies,154 IPIC secures markets for Abu Dhabi’s oil 
exports.  This decreases Abu Dhabi’s vulnerability to oil price shocks and potentially creates 
channels for oil sales higher than OPEC quota levels.  Similarly, by purchasing large or control-
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Conference 2011 Opens in Abu Dhabi, AL BAWABA (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.albawaba.com/ipra-gc-conference-2011-opens-
abu-dhabi (“through practices such as ‘name lending,’ many businesses used to get by on reputation alone”). 
 153. IPIC has made some extraordinary investments—most notably in acquiring a 16.3% stake in Barclays.  This investment 
is probably best explained as an exercise of Sheikh Mansour’s personal autonomy, the limits of which were made clearer when 
pressure from within Abu Dhabi led IPIC to reduce its stake to a more traditional five percent.  The reasons for acquiring a stake 
in a western financial institution at all probably mirror those that led to investments in Citigroup by ADIA and the KIA, and in 
Merrill Lynch by the KIA. 
 154. Such companies include OMV AG, Borealis, CEPSA, PAK Arab Refinery and Oman Polypropylene, among others.  
Moody's Publishes Credit Opinion on International Petroleum Investment, AMEINFO (Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.ameinfo.com/ 
194324.html; PAK-ARAB REFINERY LIMITED (PARCO), http://www.parco.com.pk/ (last accessed Oct. 29, 2011) (“40% of the 
shares are held by Emirate of Abu Dhabi through its Abu Dhabi Petroleum Investment Company L.L.C. (“ADPI”), a subsidiary 
group of International Petroleum Investment Company”); Prema Viswanthan, Oman PP Reduces OP Rates at PP Plant on 
Feedstock Shortage, ICIS ONLINE, http://www.icis.com/Articles/ 2010/06/11/9366972/corrected-oman-pp-reduces-op-rates-at-
pp-plant-on-feedstock-shortage.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011) (“International Petroleum Investment Co (IPIC) . . . hold[s] a 
20% stake in Oman Polypropylene.”). 
ling shares in upstream service providers like Oil Search and Arab Petroleum Pipelines Co., 
among others, IPIC ensures that Abu Dhabi will have access to the technology and human re-
sources needed to keep oil production levels high as existing reserves decline.  So, by purchasing 
petrochemical sector companies, IPIC increases Abu Dhabi’s ability to sustain oil sales and pro-
duction autonomously. 
Mubadala also pursues an aggressive investment strategy.  It has taken a share greater 
than five percent in some sixty-three companies, many of which are Western corporations.  Some 
of these companies even operate in traditionally sensitive industrial sectors like aviation155 and 
electronics.156  Mubadala’s investments follow exactly the kind of activist investment pattern that 
worries many Western investors.  The investments are explicitly made to steer future expansion 
by those companies to Abu Dhabi.157  Acquisitions in the aviation and aerospace sector were 
made in conjunction with the construction of a new airport terminal and airport free trade zone158 
and all fit within an expressed public policy goal.159  Investments in the Guinea Alumina Corpo-
ration, the Emirates Aluminum Company160 and Spyker Cars161 were all made to develop a 
seamless supply chain for aluminum that would create thousands of new jobs in Abu Dhabi.162  
Developing and diversifying the economy inside Abu Dhabi simply does not make sense for a 
SWF that is looking to maximize profits because Abu Dhabi’s sole competitive advantages are 
access to petroleum and subsidized energy.163  However, in developing state-owned “private sec-
tor” industries, Mubadala is expanding the “private sector” opportunities for future generations 
of Abu Dhabi’s citizens.  Eventually, this should enable reductions in civil service positions 
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http://www.spykercars.nl/?pag=26 (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). 
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emirates and countries located in the Middle East. 
while retaining royal control over citizens’ employment.164  Mubadala has also taken large stakes 
in non-oil energy companies165 in order to ensure continued state control over energy in Abu 
Dhabi.  Thus, overall, it is clear that Mubadala’s investment activity is autonomy-maximizing.  
Further, by separating these aggressive strategies from ADIA, any political backlash against 
Mubadala’s investments will not restrict ADIA’s ability to invest Abu Dhabi’s primary reserves. 
In summary, the formation of ADIA, placing control at the sub-national level and the pro-
liferation of new SWFs can best be described as choices made to ensure the autonomy of the rul-
ing family.  ADIA’s general strategy of investing internationally for profit is not inconsistent 
with this goal.  Indeed, its tendency to invest below reporting thresholds lends credence to an 
autonomy-maximizing strategy rather than a mercantilist one.  While some commentators have 
suggested that ADIA’s extraordinary investment in Citigroup during the financial crisis points to 
a mercantilist strategy,166 our analysis suggests that it too can best be explained in autonomy-
maximizing terms.  The size and nature of the transactions need to be viewed in the context of 
the global crisis and the relationship between the United States and Abu Dhabi.  Living up to the 
commitments implied by its relationship with a great power is essential for a small ruling elite 
that is vulnerable to internal and external threats.  Finally, the more aggressive investment strate-
gies of IPIC, ADICU (including the provision of favorable loans to political allies) and 
Mubadala also fit this explanation.  They are meant to stabilize the current balance of power 
within the royal family and maintain the unified front presented by existing elites, thereby pre-
venting vulnerability to demands made by other segments of society and protecting the auton-
omy of the ruling elite. 
C.  Singapore 
Unlike the governments in both Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, Singapore is not a hereditary 
monarchy.  Further, unlike those political entities’ SWFs, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings (“Te-
masek”) and Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (“GIC”) are not funded by natu-
ral resource revenues.  Despite these differences in local conditions, the creation, structure and 
actions of Singapore’s SWFs are best explained by autonomy-maximization.  Indeed, no other 
country has so openly embraced economic management as a means to protect the autonomy of 
the ruling elite both internally and externally.  The initial creation of SWFs in Singapore in-
creased the autonomy of Singapore’s People’s Action Party (“PAP”);167 so, too, has the evolu-
tion of Temasek and the GIC.  Just as with KIA and Abu Dhabi’s SWFs, the normal investment 
 
 164. If these companies are privatized at some point in the future, the process will likely result in disproportionate benefits 
for political allies.  Even if privatization is executed such that all citizens benefit equally, this would have the autonomy-boosting 
effect of reducing demands on ADIA funds.  Offering citizens ownership of observable large domestic companies would likely 
eliminate demands on the more substantial assets held by ADIA. 
 165. Including Dolphin Energy and the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar).  MUBADALA ANNUAL REPORT 2010, 
supra note 155, at 42. 
 166. See Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 1348–50. 
 167. The PAP has held power in Singapore since the creation of the state due to the country’s pluralist voting system.  As a 
sign of its dominance, the party held every seat in the legislature from 1968 until 1980.  See Party Milestones, PEOPLE’S ACTION 
PARTY (Oct. 15, 2011), http://www.pap.org.sg/partyhistory.php.  The PAP currently holds all but six seats.  Shamim Adam & 
Weiyi Lim, Singapore’s Lee Retains Power With Smallest Margin Since 1965, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 7, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-07/singapore-s-people-s-action-party-keeps-parliamentary-majority-state-says.html. 
patterns of these SWFs, as well as their extraordinary actions (interventions in the domestic stock 
market, purchases of large stakes in Chinese and American banks, providing assurance for the 
Barclays IPO and recapitalizing CAO) fit the pattern of autonomy-maximization but cannot be 
explained with any of the other theories we explored above. 
Singapore’s elites have always been conscious of the issue of external autonomy, and it is 
not hard to see why.  Singapore’s political history has been marked by British colonization, 
Japanese military occupation and other turmoil since its very creation.  Other than the brief reign 
of a puppet sultan in the nineteenth century, Singapore had been controlled by or subsumed 
within some foreign power from its inception until it gained independence in 1965. 168  An inde-
pendent republic, Singapore is wedged between Malaysia and Indonesia.  Although over sev-
enty-five percent of the population is ethnic Chinese,169 the presence of a substantial Malay mi-
nority has prompted its neighbors to express their desire to see regional “ethnic solidarity” from 
time to time, ensuring that stability is never certain.  For example, Indonesia sponsored terrorist 
attacks in Singapore during the 1960s to foment racial riots as part of its bet to prevent the unifi-
cation of the Malaysian peninsula.  Relations with Malaysia, the country from which Singapore 
separated, have also remained tense.  Malaysia disputed Singapore’s maritime claims until 
1995,170 and Singapore is also completely reliant on the Malaysian state of Johor for its drinking 
water.171  It is therefore unsurprising that Singapore’s elites have approached politics with a 
rather realist interpretation.172 
Given that Singapore is, however, a tiny country relative to its neighbors (much less rela-
tive to whatever global power has been ascendant at a given time), it has never been able to rely 
strictly on military power to secure its existence.  Relying on a sense of historical legitimacy 
within the region was an equally untenable plan given Singapore’s origins as an imperialist out-
post. 
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 172. As early as 1966, Singapore’s first prime minister (and still the dominant figure in Singaporean politics), Lee Kuan 
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At independence, the domestic situation was equally tenuous.  The country’s per capita 
GDP was under $400 and unemployment was high.  Singapore’s entrepôt-based economy could 
not provide enough jobs to defuse racial tensions over employment, and industrial infrastructure 
was minimal;173 a concerted industrial development policy was urgently needed.174  As others 
have commented, the only way to “wean the native Malay population from ethnic politics was 
through the appeal of social democratic policies,”175 but full socialism was impossible absent a 
union with the Malay hinterland.  Therefore, when the merger experiment between Singapore 
and Malaysia failed, the PAP was forced to embark on an alternate path. 
As Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, would later ex-
plain, the PAP “decided soon after independence to link Singapore up with the advanced coun-
tries and make [them]selves a hub or nodal point for the expansion and extension of their activi-
ties.”176  This initial industrial policy was carried out through substantial investments and 
subsidized loans made by the Economic Development Board into domestic and foreign compa-
nies.  The twin tactics served the dual purposes of creating vested foreign interests in the contin-
ued viability of Singapore as an autonomous state and creating employment for the working class 
to quiet ethnic tensions.177 
By requiring private savings to be paid into the Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) and in-
centivizing additional private purchases of government bonds, Singapore managed to co-opt a 
substantial pool of private capital into the service of the government.178  Critically, given Singa-
pore’s young population at the time, the CPF’s liabilities would not come due for decades.  The 
allocation of assets, however, would be specifically approved by government bureaucrats accord-
ing to current policy goals.179  Therefore, the move can be interpreted as serving two goals.  
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First, it created a public perception that the PAP was critically responsible for the country’s new 
private sector growth.  Second, it created a financial cushion to ward off economic downturns.  
This, in turn, assured that the PAP would be able to provide continued economic growth and sta-
bility even during times of economic shocks—thereby protecting the autonomy of the ruling 
elite. 
In addition, the country pursued an active industrial policy to accelerate growth and posi-
tion Singapore as a critical economy in the Far East.  According to Suppiah Dhanabalan, the 
longtime Chairman of Temasek, Singapore incentivized capital investments in manufacturing 
from both local and foreign sources by taking minority stakes in companies and making subsi-
dized loans through the Economic Development Board (“EDB”).180  In an effort to separate regu-
latory and business functions, the government transferred EDB’s industrial loan portfolio to DBS 
Bank in 1968 and transferred EDB’s equity holdings to the Ministry of Finance.181  During this 
early period, a special department within the Ministry of Finance managed these holdings.182  
However, in 1974 the department was reorganized into Temasek, a limited liability company 
owned by the Ministry.183  This raises questions as to why a special entity was needed and 
whether this reorganization served primarily administrative functions or other goals. 
The official story is, of course, that the creation of Temasek was simply a decision made 
to separate the business and regulatory functions of the government to increase efficiency.184  
Given that the transfer of the EDB’s equities to the Ministry of Finance was supposed to achieve 
this same goal, however, Temasek seems a bit redundant.  Additionally, the timing was some-
what suspect, as one would have anticipated that Temasek would have been created at the same 
time that the EDB’s loan portfolio was used to capitalize DBS Bank six years earlier.  Finally, 
the fact that Singapore’s regulatory bodies continued to protect monopolies held by Temasek-
controlled companies185 suggests that the separation of regulatory and equity interests does not 
initially seem to have caused any tangible changes in regulatory policy. 
Mercantilist theory offers little insight on the creation of a separate government-owned 
corporation:  the distinction between channeling capital accumulation through a Ministry or a 
Ministry-owned corporation is irrelevant because either can be used to ensure that capital stays 
within the country.  Creating Temasek as an independent entity does not support the account that 
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 185. Burton Ong, who discusses the likely impact of Singapore’s new competition law on government affiliated companies, 
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Singapore’s SWFs are imperialist-capitalists either.  When a country is trying to capture above-
market rents through the imposition of imperial force, it would seem to be beneficial to keep a 
direct link between its equity investments and the state.  That way, investment targets would be 
more compliant for fear of the political consequences of resisting the SWF.  Rather, the creation 
of Temasek is consistent with the actions of a rational market-based investor:  vesting investment 
decisions in an autonomous company should increase returns over those generated by officials 
within a politicized Ministry of Finance. 
The creation of Temasek is also consistent with the autonomy-maximization theory ad-
vanced in this paper, especially when considering the timing of the creation of this sovereign 
wealth fund within its broader geopolitical context.  Temasek was incorporated in the same year 
that American forces withdrew from Vietnam.  This threatened to disrupt the tenuous balance of 
power in Southeast Asia that Singapore had worked carefully to create.186  By shifting its portfo-
lio of equities to a formal corporation separated from the government, Singapore signaled to the 
West that it was committed to capitalist principles while the Ministry of Finance’s retention of 
the equity interest in Temasek (and the fact that the new company was largely staffed by civil 
servants)187 signaled to the socialist world that Singapore was not fully in the pocket of Western 
interests.  By adopting corporate formalities while retaining certain socialist aspects, Singapore 
was able to chart a middle ground that kept all sides interested in Singapore’s continued viability 
and protected the autonomy of the PAP. 
Funding is another mechanism by which Singapore’s government, and thus the PAP, re-
tains control over Temasek.  Despite occasional protests that Temasek should not be considered 
a conventional SWF because it receives only small capital injections from the government from 
time to time rather than on a regular basis,188 Singapore’s capital injection in 2008 of close to 
S$21 billion189 was equal to more than ten percent of Temasek’s portfolio value at the time.190  
While this occurred in the midst of the global financial crisis, it serves to illustrate the central 
role of Temasek in Singapore’s economic policy.  Further, as a Fifth Schedule Company,191 Te-
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masek must obtain the approval of the Singaporean President if the value of its portfolio falls be-
low what it was when the current government took office.192  Since the PAP ensured that its 
nominee for president ran unopposed by any viable alternative candidate from Singapore’s inde-
pendence through 2011, the presidential approval requirement ensured that the PAP would have 
a veto right over Temasek’s annual budget for a full election cycle even if the party were to lose 
its majority in Parliament.193  In the 2011 presidential race, the PAP did not officially endorse a 
candidate for the presidency and allowed four candidates to qualify.  Of the four, however, three 
were former PAP members, and the winner, Tony Tan Keng Yam, was the PAP’s favored candi-
date and a long-serving PAP cabinet member, former deputy Prime Minister and the former head 
of GIC.194  The implications of the 2011 election are unclear, but for the moment the PAP retains 
control of both Parliament and the presidency.195 
Temasek’s sister fund, GIC, was established more recently in 1981.  It serves as another 
illustration of how small states use economic resources to placate major powers on whose good-
will they ultimately depend.  By 1981, Singapore’s economy had developed significantly and 
had emerged as one of the Asian tigers and dragons (alongside Hong Kong, Taiwan and South 
Korea) due at least in part to an aggressive export-led growth strategy.196  In addition, the econ-
omy was generating both persistent positive cash flows (through Temasek’s investment in do-
mestic companies197) and new low-cost capital (from individual savings in the Central Provident 
Fund).198 There was simply too much money available to invest solely within Singapore.  More-
over, there was increasing international pressure on Singapore and other countries with substan-
tial accumulations of excess reserves to recycle them for the benefit of the global economy, es-
pecially in the aftermath of the oil crisis, which had exposed vulnerabilities in the Western export 
markets.199  Thus, it was fairly apparent that international investment opportunities should be 
pursued.  However, investments into foreign public corporations by a holding company for what 
were essentially state-owned enterprises probably would not have been warmly received in 
Western democracies.  Establishing a separate institution to manage Singapore’s excess revenues 
allowed for a distinction to be made between the hands-on domestic economic policies of the 
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PAP implemented through Temasek and the country’s international investments.  Thus, estab-
lishing the GIC enabled Singapore to access a broader range of investment opportunities without 
triggering a political backlash. 
As discussed in the Abu Dhabi case study, creating a separate SWF for domestic and for-
eign investments also prevents management or employees at either fund from establishing a 
powerful competing locus of authority with ties to both domestic businesses and international ac-
tors.  This approach protects the existing privileged position and autonomy of local elites.  In the 
case of Singapore, the political importance of controlling SWFs and the investment opportunities 
they provide is illustrated by the fact that Lee Kuan Yew became chairman of GIC at a time 
when he was still serving as the country’s prime minister and has retained this position ever 
since.200  Further, establishing a second SWF expands the institutional space available to reward 
allies or sideline potential rivals and ensures their loyalty to the ruling elite.201 
Specializing investment functions is, of course, also perfectly consistent with profit 
maximization.  Moreover, the shift to international investments is a move capitalist or socialist 
imperialist accounts predict.202  However, closer inspection of GIC’s financial resources and 
their management strongly point towards autonomy-maximization.  GIC receives money from 
the public budget.  However, because part of the CPF’s portfolio is Singaporean government 
bonds, the CPF functions to mobilize the mandatory contributions by Singaporean employees—a 
cheap source of captive capital—to facilitate GIC’s activities abroad.203  This ingratiates the PAP 
with the international community, signaling that it is a cooperative player in rebalancing global 
currency accounts.  It also allows the PAP to increase the size of Singapore’s reserves relatively 
easily since its cost of capital is so low.  (This increase serves as propaganda each year to boost 
popular domestic support for the PAP.)  These easy returns are also used to justify high salaries 
for GIC employees—even those who serve in ex officio positions204—which serves to increase 
the attractiveness of remaining on good terms with the PAP rather than mounting a political chal-
lenge. 
So far we have argued that the establishment of separate entities to manage funds that 
could be invested to boost domestic development or to invest internationally supports the auton-
omy maximization theory advanced in this article.  We now extend this argument and suggest 
that the governance structure of both funds lends further credence to our theory. 
Temasek’s formal governance structure is the same as that of conventional limited liabil-
ity companies found in the West.205  Senior management is selected and overseen by a board of 
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directors, which is in turn elected by shareholders.206  The official line is that the Board is inde-
pendent of the government because a majority of its directors are “non-executive independent 
private sector business leaders.”207  However, Temasek’s sole shareholder is the Ministry of Fi-
nance, making it questionable how effective the presence of a Board is in separating Temasek 
from the government.  Clearly, in the event of any substantial disagreement between the party 
and the Board over Temasek’s strategy or actions, it would be relatively simple for the Ministry 
of Finance to call a shareholder meeting to replace the entire slate of directors.  Further, the ap-
pointment or removal of directors to Fifth Schedule Companies like Temasek requires Presiden-
tial approval under Singapore’s Constitution.208  Additional evidence comes from the staffing of 
top positions at Temasek, which are filled by PAP insiders, ensuring PAP influence on Te-
masek’s day-to-day activities.  Most obviously, the CEO of Temasek, Ho Ching, is the wife of 
Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore’s current prime minister and the son of Lee Kuan Yew.  Further, 
Ho Ching was nominated to be CEO shortly after her husband was elected Prime Minister, sug-
gesting that her selection is part of a strategy to transfer power to the next generation of the Lee 
Kuan Yew cartel.209  The Chairman of the Board, Suppiah Dhanabalan, is another example.  He 
worked at the EDB prior to its funds being transferred to Temasek, was a prominent PAP politi-
cian during the 1980s,210 held numerous ministerial portfolios and remains a key member of the 
Lee Kuan Yew inner circle.211 
In defense of the rather clubby (and somewhat nepotistic) appointments, Lee Hsien 
Loong has said that Singapore is “such a small society if you want everybody to be disconnected 
from everybody else, we just don’t have the bodies.”212  Perhaps this is true on some level, but it 
would certainly be possible to find non-family and even non-party members to fill these posi-
tions.  Temasek’s governance structure therefore allows the PAP to maintain control over Te-
masek which in turn facilitates the PAP’s ongoing efforts to guide Singapore’s economy and re-
tain control of the government. 
The Chip Goodyear fiasco at Temasek provides a good example of how its governance 
structure does not actually isolate the Board from political considerations.  In February 2009, 
Temasek announced that Chip Goodyear would become Temasek’s new CEO, replacing Ms. Ho 
as of October 2009.213  However, the transfer of power never materialized and Goodyear left the 
company in the summer of 2009.  Officially, there was a conflict in management style and strat-
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egy.214  It was, perhaps, a pleasant way to state that Goodyear had proven unexpectedly resistant 
to suggestions from the political elite notwithstanding an extended search to fill the position and 
a longstanding relationship between Temasek’s chairman and Goodyear.  Others speculated that 
Goodyear’s previous position at BHP Billiton might have made his appointment a rather poor 
signal to China in light of its battle with another Australian mining company, Rio Tinto, at the 
time.215  In any event, the Board’s attempt to replace Ho Ching failed. 
The governance structure of the GIC is, perhaps, even more revealing of the importance 
of Singapore’s SWFs to the ruling elite.  Similar to Temasek, the GIC is organized as a formal 
corporation with management that reports to a board of directors who are, in turn, elected by 
shareholders.  As with Temasek, however, the sole shareholder is the Ministry of Finance.216  
Thus, as long as the PAP retains control of the government, it has the power to select all direc-
tors.  Additionally, like Temasek, GIC is a Fifth Schedule Company, implying that no director 
may be appointed or removed without Presidential approval.217  This “safeguard” also ensures 
that in the event of an unexpected loss of parliamentary control, the PAP would still control the 
board of GIC for at least the remainder of the President’s term.218 
As can be seen by the current Board’s composition, the PAP closely supervises the GIC.  
Lee Kuan Yew served as the Chairman of GIC from 1981 through 2011 (and still retains a posi-
tion as a “senior advisor”); he was succeeded by his son Lee Hsien Loong.219  Among the other 
eleven directors are the current Ministers of Finance, Trade and Industry, Home Affairs and 
Education, along with a former Minister of Finance who had served in that position for sixteen 
years and the former second minister of Foreign Affairs.220  Five seats are held by current senior 
managers within GIC and two are held by senior managers of Temasek-controlled companies.221  
Ang Kong Hua is the only director with no ties to the PAP who is not currently working for a 
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company controlled by one of Singapore’s SWFs.  Overall, eleven of the twelve directors are 
strongly connected to the PAP or work for a company the government owns.222  The career pat-
terns leave the impression that a board position at GIC is a reward for outstanding (and loyal) 
services in business or government.  This also ensures that GIC’s strategies are aligned with the 
interests of Singapore’s elites. 
More than governance structures and personnel decisions, however, the controversy sur-
rounding SWFs and their motives and strategies is concerned with their actual investment behav-
ior.  Temasek has traditionally taken controlling stakes in domestic companies and large minority 
stakes in regional companies.  As discussed, Temasek’s strategy has allowed the PAP to pick 
winners in the domestic market and foster the development of specific industrial sectors.  Te-
masek began to develop an international profile only over the past decade.  Closer inspection of 
its regional investments suggests a similar pattern. 
Temasek is highly selective in its choice of regional investments and tends to take rela-
tively large stakes.  In fact, governments in the region often seek out Temasek to become a core 
investor in industries that require a stable shareholder or to defuse political tension in their own 
countries.  These investments arguably serve the dual purposes of generating profits and aligning 
the interests of potential regional political rivals (and former enemies). 
For example, Temasek invested in several Indonesian banks in the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis when the recapitalization of banks was of paramount importance to regional po-
litical stability.  It now holds substantial minority positions in Alliance Bank (Malaysia) and 
Bank Danamon (Indonesia),223 and the host government has invited it to take positions in Indo-
nesian and Thai telecommunications companies.  While Temasek was eventually forced to divest 
its stakes in Indonesian telecoms Telkomsel and Indosat due to a controversial anti-trust rul-
ing,224 the fact remains that the Indonesian government specifically invited the initial investment. 
Temasek’s purchase of a 49.6% stake in Thai telecom company Shin Corporation was 
supposed to demonstrate Singapore’s ability to assist regional allies by helping then-Prime Min-
ister Thaksin Shinawatra defuse allegations that his investment and telecommunications policies 
were aimed at benefiting a company his family owned.225  Unfortunately for Temasek and Sin-
gapore, this acquisition sparked a “wave of unrest” that eventually resulted in a military coup and 
the ouster of Thaksin.226  This episode demonstrates that even regional investments bear addi-
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tional political risks relative to domestic investments.  Whereas Temasek benefits from complete 
political support inside Singapore, it has little control over changes in the political winds in other 
countries.  Not surprisingly, Temasek has treaded more carefully in recent years when investing 
regionally. 
While Temasek’s actions are regularly publicized, the GIC has largely avoided public 
scrutiny despite managing a larger portfolio.227  This is fairly comparable to the situation in Abu 
Dhabi.  The SWF tasked with investing globally (here, GIC) takes small stakes that are well be-
low thresholds that would invite scrutiny or trigger disclosure requirements imposed by foreign 
regulators.  Even on its own website, GIC discloses only highly aggregated figures describing its 
portfolio.228  As mentioned in the previous case studies, this strategy is autonomy-maximizing 
because it maximizes the number of investment opportunities that GIC can pursue without trig-
gering a political backlash. 
It is, of course, true that the general investment patterns of both Temasek and GIC are 
consistent with autonomy maximization or profit maximization.  True preferences, however, are 
often revealed in a crisis.229  Crises are extreme events that may prompt actors to make unusual 
and economically irrational decisions.  Sometimes, however, these decisions reveal deep-seated 
priorities that are difficult to discern in normal times when wealth maximization neatly coincides 
with political interests.  Examining the reactions of Temasek and GIC to several crises over the 
past decade thus helps to shed light on their underlying motives. 
The first example dates back to 2004, when China Aviation Oil (“CAO”), a subsidiary of 
China Aviation Oil Holding Company (“CAOHC”), a large company trading on Singapore’s 
SGX exchange, collapsed.230  CAO had taken substantial short positions on oil at a time when 
prices were increasing relentlessly.  Consequently, it was forced to file for bankruptcy but was 
reorganized and eventually relisted on the SGX.  A closer look at this fairly innocuous chain of 
events reveals, however, a complex sequence of interactions between the Chinese and Singapor-
ean governments in which Temasek played a central role.  In a last-minute attempt to rescue 
CAO, its parent company, CAOHC, engaged in insider trading under Singapore’s laws.231  Te-
masek and the other investors were wiped out when CAO filed for bankruptcy only weeks later.  
Singapore’s Monetary Authority faced the stark choice of enforcing its insider trading rules (and 
 
 227. Temasek reported that the market value of its portfolio has recovered from the financial crisis and rose to a new high of 
$183 billion in March 2010.  Netty Ismail, Temasek’s Assets Set to Reclaim Peak as Asia Pays Off, BUS. WEEK (July 7, 2010), 
available at http://www.theedgesingapore.com/component/content/17550/17550.html?task=view& showall=1.  GIC does not 
disclose its portfolio’s value, but it was speculated to be about $200 billion as of March 31, 2009.  Costas Paris and P.R. Venkat, 
Singapore’s GIC’s Portfolio Suffers Loss In Fiscal 2009, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES (Sept. 29, 2009), 
http://singaporeelection.blogspot.com/2011/04/wsj-singapores-gic-suffers-416-billion.html. 
 228. Supra note 216, at 11–12. 
 229. For a discussion on using crisis moments to analyze governance regimes, see generally CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & 
KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM:  WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD (2008). 
 230. For a detailed account of this case, see id. at 125. 
 231. Two months before CAO filed for bankruptcy, it offered fifteen percent of its shares in CAO to investors in a private 
placement but failed to disclose that the funds raised would be lent to CAO to meet its obligations to the counterparties on its oil 
futures and creditors who had provided short-term liquidity.  See id.  Temasek was one of the lead investors buying shares in this 
placement, which was read by other market participants as a signal of safety despite rumors that CAO was troubled.  John 
Burton, BP and Temasek to Buy Stake into CAO, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d629ef2-5b4c-
11da-b221-0000779e2340.html#axzz1abh5SfOH. 
assuring foreign investors in particular of its commitment to strong investor protection) or soft-
pedaling in order to protect its relations with China.232  In nothing less than a coordinated ap-
proach, the Monetary Authority levied a substantial fine on CAO, but Temasek recapitalized 
CAO within the week, thereby ensuring CAO’s re-listing on the Singapore stock exchange—an 
entity in which Temasek indirectly holds a twenty-four percent stake.233  The events were 
quickly followed by an announcement that Temasek had been chosen as one of two initial inves-
tors in the China Construction Bank (CCB)—a highly anticipated opportunity, given that it was 
the first of China’s four largest banks to go public.234  Evidently, by choosing a middle ground, 
Temasek preserved its ability to invest in Chinese companies, thereby maximizing its future 
range of investment options and its autonomy. 
In line with the behavior of KIA and ADIA described above, both Temasek and GIC took 
major stakes in struggling banks and investment banks in the midst of the global financial crisis 
and invested repeatedly even after booking losses on their original investments.  Temasek ac-
quired a 13.7 percent stake in Merrill Lynch through substantial investments in late 2007 and the 
fall of 2008.235  While Temasek has always maintained that it was investing in Merrill Lynch be-
cause it thought that the company was undervalued (thus protecting its “profit-maximizing” cre-
dentials), skepticism is warranted.  Temasek’s initial $6 billion investment in December 2007 
occurred at a time when many suspected that western banks were facing substantial impending 
losses on their subprime loan portfolios.  Perhaps Temasek simply misjudged Merrill’s exposure. 
However, when it became clearer that Merrill was, in fact, facing massive write-downs, Temasek 
followed its paper losses with another $6.6 billion to shore up Merrill’s balance sheet.236  Te-
masek again stepped into the breach with another $3.4 billion in the fall of 2008 (part of which, 
however, was from a $2.5 billion reset payment that was triggered under the earlier investments 
when Merrill sold additional shares to other investors at prices below those for which it had sold 
to Temasek).237  After its shares in Merrill were converted to Bank of America shares as part of 
that merger, Temasek closed out its position in early 2009, resulting in an estimated $4.6 billion 
loss.238  Temasek’s loss-chasing behavior cannot be explained by profit-maximizing motivations.  
It did, however, help to support the health of the international financial system, thereby helping 
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to protect the value of Singapore’s U.S. dollar-denominated reserves, and demonstrated that Sin-
gapore is a cooperative player in the global financial system. 
GIC’s contributions to the recapitalizations of UBS and Citigroup during the financial 
crisis gave it stakes of about eight percent and eleven percent, respectively, in the companies.239  
This, of course, seems somewhat contrary to its usual low-profile investment pattern.  However, 
it seems likely that GIC did not expect to actually take such a substantial stake—or even convert 
its preferred shares.  Even when the preferred shares dropped in value by eighty percent, GIC 
held onto them.  However, when the U.S. government indicated that Citigroup needed to increase 
its tier one capital reserves, but that converting its own preferred stock was contingent on other 
investors following suit,240 the writing was on the wall.  The U.S. government was implicitly 
providing support for SWFs to take large stakes in Citigroup.  Conversion of the preferred shares 
to common shares was the only viable option for salvaging Citigroup’s total common equity ra-
tio.  This also had the benefit of converting GIC’s paper loss from eighty percent to twenty-four 
percent,241 but it eliminated GIC’s claim to a seven percent dividend payment.  A profit-
maximizing investor responsive to short-term shareholders would have either converted or sold 
off its preferred shares earlier to minimize its paper losses and the accompanying criticism.  A 
rational long-term investor (which GIC purports to be) should have continued to hold its pre-
ferred shares despite the suspension of dividend payments in order to eventually benefit from the 
seven percent dividend, which was temporarily being paid to a trust.  GIC, however, delayed the 
conversion until it had the tacit support of the U.S. government, thereby signaling its cooperative 
posture in the global financial system and protecting its future ability to invest in the United 
States.  To avoid ongoing American regulatory scrutiny, a prompt sell-off to bring ownership be-
low five percent was required and it occurred.242  This entire sequence of events is neither consis-
tent with profit maximization nor with mercantilist theories.  Instead, it demonstrates the use of 
these funds for autonomy maximizing purposes:  they are used for highly risky investments to 
signal cooperation and maintain stability, even when this comes at a substantial economic loss.  
And contrary to predictions that would follow from mercantilist arguments, they are not retained 
to exert future control. 
In addition to making stabilizing investments in western banks, Singapore’s SWFs are 
deeply involved in the Chinese market.  The rise of China is arguably the greatest threat to Sin-
gapore’s role as a major economic hub in the Far East and its role as a bridge between East and 
West.  As China has asserted its own central place in global finance with the rise of the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock exchanges, Hong Kong and Shanghai are competing over their share in the 
listing of firms from mainland China.243 
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A striking example of this is when the CCB, the Bank of China and the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (“ICBC”) were partially privatized in 2005 and 2006.  Between 
them, these banks attracted substantial investments from western institutions like Bank of Amer-
ica, RBS and Goldman Sachs.244  However, when these institutions came under pressure at home 
to improve their tier one capital base, they chose to generate cash by selling off their stakes in the 
Chinese banks.  As the initial investments were subject to a three-year lock-in period that expired 
in early 2009, it looked as if shares in China’s banks would be flooding the market precisely 
when financial markets were down, with likely negative repercussions for China’s financial insti-
tutions.  Government-linked Chinese institutional investors picked up most of the shares western 
banks sold.  This could have looked like western investors were selling off their low-quality as-
sets, thereby damaging the value of the Chinese banks.245 
However, one major foreign investor, Temasek, also participated.246  At a time when pri-
vate investors were shying away from investing in financial institutions, including those in 
China, Temasek shouldered the risk once more and signaled to external capital markets that the 
Chinese banks were still valuable (and not simply being propped up by the Chinese government 
through a back channel).  Last, but not least, Temasek also appeared as one of the core investors 
that backed the IPO in 2010 of the Agricultural Bank of China, the last of the four major Chinese 
banks that had been slated for partial privatization.247  Our theory suggests that Temasek made 
these investments in the Chinese financial sector to signal that an independent and largely 
autonomous PAP is a useful friend for China, which, in turn, should provide a rationale for 
China to avoid impinging on the PAP’s autonomy. 
To summarize, the creation, internal governance structures and investment patterns of 
Singapore’s SWFs fit our autonomy-maximizing theory.  Creating the institutions made the gov-
ernment, rather than individuals, the primary beneficiary of high domestic savings rates, ensuring 
that the PAP would remain firmly in control of Singapore’s economic development.  As dis-
cussed, each institution is clearly controlled by members of the PAP inner circle, and their gov-
ernance structures ensure that this will remain the case.  Extraordinary investments into key for-
eign financial institutions in both Asia and the West demonstrated Singapore’s value in the 
international financial system, thereby ensuring that global players will remain engaged in Sin-
gapore to provide an implicit security guarantee against any regional threats.  Parallel support for 
the Chinese and western financial sectors helps to ensure that both will continue to engage with 
Singapore rather than leaving it to the other’s sphere of influence.  Singapore’s SWFs also some-
times act to soften the impact of policies or actions undertaken by Singapore’s government that 
would adversely affect the interests of these more powerful global actors.  The strategy has 
proven successful, as Singapore and the PAP have been able to weather financial crises without 
incurring any obligations to outside countries or institutions—all while steadily improving their 
own regional security situation. 
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D.  China 
In some, but not all, respects, China is an outlier among the political entities surveyed in 
this paper.  Unlike the Gulf States or Singapore, China is big—home to the largest population in 
the world—and is an emerging global power.  Consequently, security motives do not play such a 
large role in motivating China’s establishment of SWFs.  Yet even in this case, the basic argu-
ment that SWFs are instruments designed to maximize the autonomy of ruling elites both domes-
tically and internationally has substantial traction. 
We would like to acknowledge at the outset that among the political entities discussed 
herein, China comes closest to acting like a mercantilist.248  This fact is apparent in natural re-
source investments that SWFs and other state-controlled entities in China have made across the 
globe.249  These investments, which are frequently paired with aid to support infrastructure de-
velopment, are clearly meant to secure China’s access to resources that are indispensable for the 
continuing growth of its economy.  Nonetheless, not all investments have this overtone.  Specifi-
cally, the entities that invest China’s large foreign exchange reserves, the State Administration 
for Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) and China Investment Corporation (“CIC”), seem to pursue a 
much broader strategy, in which resource acquisition may play only a minor role. 
The continued importance of the government as owner and manager of economic entities 
in China makes drawing a clear distinction between what counts as a SWF and what is simply a 
state-owned enterprise exceedingly difficult.  In fact, the generic definition of SWFs in the litera-
ture, which we have endorsed as well, does not facilitate such a distinction.  Some sources list a 
number of state sponsored funds, including SAFE and CIC as well as China’s National Social 
Security Fund, as SWFs, which is entirely consistent with the above definition.250 
Nonetheless, we will focus for the most part on CIC for two reasons.  First, it is the only 
entity that has been officially designated by China as a SWF.251  It is also the most transparent 
institution, which makes an assessment of China’s SWF governance structure and investment 
strategies much easier.  Second, CIC invests both domestically and internationally.  SAFE has 
also been reported to invest globally, but as an administrative agency, it can do so only through 
special investment entities.  Apparently, SAFE has established such entities in Hong Kong and 
has used them to invest in a series of companies that are listed on the London Stock Exchange.252  
However, very little is known about how much and where SAFE invests China’s foreign ex-
change reserves. 
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CIC was officially established in the fall of 2007 in response to growing pressures from 
the international community, in particular the United States, to reinvest the rapidly increasing 
foreign exchange reserves the country had accumulated.253  This is highly reminiscent of the in-
ternational pressure that triggered the creation of Singapore’s GIC.254  As it happened, CIC was 
established at the very moment that the global financial crisis began to unfold.  This was almost 
certainly not planned but has left its marks on CIC’s early investments abroad. 
Formally, CIC is directly under the control of the State Council, China’s executive 
branch of government.  Its most powerful stakeholder, however, is the Ministry of Finance.  It 
provided CIC with its start-up capital by issuing bonds to the public and handing over the pro-
ceeds so that CIC could acquire foreign exchange from the People’s Bank of China (“PBoC”), 
China’s central bank for its foreign exchange reserves.255  Thus, CIC was initially entirely debt 
financed.  This created a heavy burden on CIC to generate substantial return on its investments in 
order to meet monthly interest payments.  This structure proved to be unsustainable, especially in 
light of the global financial crisis.  By August of 2009, an agreement was struck to recharacterize 
the initial capital contribution as equity rather than debt, thereby eliminating CIC’s need to make 
regular interest payments256 and establishing it as an entity with no external liabilities. 
CIC’s official mission is “to make long-term investments that maximize risk-adjusted fi-
nancial returns for the benefit of the State, our shareholder.”257  In an attempt to reassure the 
global public that this does not entail state control akin to the old socialist model, the report goes 
on to state: 
Our legal framework and governance model require us to operate as an independ-
ent commercial entity in an environment of sound corporate governance.  We are 
committed to maintaining excellent professional and ethical standards in corpo-
rate governance, transparency and accountability.  We have the full support of our 
shareholder to achieve our mission and attain these goals.258 
This statement is obviously meant to assure the global community about CIC’s objectives 
but does not necessarily give an accurate account of how the entity operates.  We therefore scru-
tinize the formal governance structure of CIC, the identities of those charged with running the 
fund and its investment strategy (or at least as much of CIC’s strategy as can be gleaned from its 
investments during its short existence to date).  In analyzing the CIC, we find only limited sup-
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port for a mercantilist argument and similarly limited support for CIC’s self-proclamation that it 
is completely driven by risk-adjusted returns.  Many of CIC’s international investments are small 
and passive, indicating that mercantilism is not the driving force behind CIC.  CIC’s larger ac-
quisitions can best be explained as reactions to the global financial crisis—and indicate motives 
that are not aligned with maximizing risk-adjusted returns.  CIC’s refusal to turn its stakes in 
global financial institutions into mechanisms of control also indicates that mercantilism and im-
perialism are not its primary drivers. 
We argue that CIC’s investments in global financial institutions during the crisis served 
to assure other major stakeholders in the global financial system (especially the United States) 
that China is a cooperative player and that it is not using its growing economic and financial 
power to control international markets.  China’s actions at the time were critical to deflating, at 
least temporarily, the pressure on China to abandon its efforts to subsidize export-driven growth 
through an undervalued exchange rate. 
At present, China’s leadership does not see an alternative to this strategy and is acutely 
aware of the fact that continued economic growth is critical for maintaining its hold on power.  
In fact, during the crisis, CIC was being used to infuse capital into China’s major financial insti-
tutions so that they could expand their credit facilities and prop up the domestic economy, 
thereby protecting Chinese jobs.  This closely resembles similar practices in Singapore, where 
Temasek and GIC were also used to insure against a more severe economic downturn that could 
have put domestic political pressure on the country’s leadership.  It also shows that CIC has been 
used as an instrument of monetary policy—which is not exactly within the purview of an inves-
tor looking to maximize risk-adjusted returns. 
As a limited liability company, CIC’s formal governance structure is similar to the con-
ventional Western corporation.  It has a board of directors that selects and supervises a manage-
ment team, and there is some overlap between the two.259  However, when looking at the actual 
personnel, it is clear that there is an additional governance system in place that is decidedly 
“Chinese.”  Those serving on CIC’s board or as executives were drawn from China’s financial 
elite—a cohort of financial cadres that has been groomed by the Communist Party, which ulti-
mately controls their career path.  CIC’s chairman of the board of directors and CEO is Lou Ji-
wei, and the vice chairman, president and chief investment officer is Gao Xiqing.260  Both men 
come with extensive experience in government services, including in the financial sector.  Mr. 
Lou has previously held several positions, including those at the State Council, the Ministry of 
Finance and the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic Systems.261  Likewise, Mr. 
Gao has served in the general counsel’s office of China’s Securities Regulatory Commission 
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(“SRC”) as well as at the National Council for the Social Security Fund.262  Indeed, inspection 
reveals that without exception, every member of CIC’s board of directors, every executive and 
every member of its supervisory board has held or concurrently holds key positions in govern-
ment, including positions at the PBoC, SAFE, the Ministry of Finance, regulatory bodies over-
seeing banking, finance and securities and at government-controlled financial intermediaries like 
Hui Jin Corporation, which holds the government’s stakes in China’s major banks and is a sub-
sidiary of CIC.263 
The ubiquity of such cross-placements suggests that the formal governance structure of 
CIC is deeply embedded in a dense network of personal ties.  In contrast to the Gulf states, where 
personal ties are formed by kinship relations, or Singapore, where the small size of the country 
and its elite facilitates a combination of kinship and meritocracy, in China the network is main-
tained by the Organizational Committee of the Communist Party (OCCP).  The OCCP has the 
power to appoint and dismiss key cadres within China’s system of governance not only in poli-
tics, but also in the economy and finance.  It governs by controlling human capital.  The CCP 
regularly updates a rulebook that lists the positions over which it commands control,264 which in-
clude positions in top financial intermediaries.265 
The role of the CCP in governing China’s financial system is consistent with our auton-
omy-maximization theory.  The CCP has asserted its control over the financial sector by way of 
controlling appointments to key positions at the very moment that China began to open the state-
controlled sector to private and foreign investors.  As part of China’s WTO agreement, it com-
mitted to open the financial sector fully to foreign investment by the end of 2006.266  The likely 
repercussions of financial liberalization (i.e., the threat to state control of the economy) were 
mitigated by two strategies.  First, China invited strategic investors to acquire large stakes in ma-
jor banks prior to the liberalization deadline in 2006, thereby ensuring that it controlled who 
would acquire such stakes and on what terms.267  These investors entered into three-year lock-up 
agreements, which ensured that these arrangements would extend well beyond the liberalization 
deadline of 2006.  Second, the CCP asserted its control rights over the financial sector by creat-
ing the OCCP to oversee the recruitment of financial cadres to key positions in finance—
including at large banks that had just been partially privatized.268 
These strategies can be interpreted as mercantilist, but they also reflect an attempt by the 
CCP to control a sector that is vital for managing the economy and ensuring continuous growth.  
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In a country where political accountability is absent, delivering growth has become the most im-
portant source of the ruling elite’s legitimacy.  China has become adept at camouflaging its real 
governance structure by adopting elements of “good governance” from the West.  Incorporating 
CIC as a limited liability company was the first step in this direction.  In addition, CIC has as-
sembled an international advisory board that includes former World Bank president Jim Wolfen-
son, former chief economist at the World Bank Nicholas Stern, former member of the WTO’s 
appellate body and professor at Columbia’s School of International Public Affairs (“SIPA”) 
Merit Janow and Vice Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Lawrence Lau.  The 
only member with a specific financial background is Taizo Nishimuro of Japan, who heads the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Group.269  Clearly, the recruitment of these international dignitaries270 is 
meant to assure outsiders that CIC is playing by the rules of international corporate governance 
and to deflect demands for the actual allocation of control rights, which in China lie mostly be-
yond formal legal structures.271 
CIC’s investment strategy is bifurcated into domestic and international investments with 
slightly more than fifty percent of its initial capital of U.S.$200 billion assigned for foreign in-
vestment.272  A large chunk of the capital designated for domestic acquisition was spent on the 
acquisition of Hui Jin Investment Corporation, a government-owned entity that was previously 
established to manage the government’s controlling stakes in China’s largest banks.273 
Although CIC is the parent of Hui Jin, it does not have the authority to appoint Hui Jin’s 
board.  The State Council—subject to the approval of the OCCP—makes appointments to the 
Hui Jin Board.274  Moreover, management operations of the two entities are strictly separated.  
The picture that emerges from these interlocking (rather than hierarchical) boards of directors is 
one where a central agent—here, the CCP and its OCCP—controls the most important resource 
for the financial sector:  human capital.  With the help of party organs275 that ensure that top 
management personnel at partially privatized banks have spent at least some time working for 
the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China or another state agency, the CCP maintains 
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its grip on the financial sector, and CIC is a central part of this regime.276 
This background is also critical when assessing CIC’s international investments.  CIC 
made its first major international investment in May 2007, months before the SWF was officially 
launched.  It acquired a ten percent stake in Blackstone, which reorganized into a limited part-
nership structure and launched its IPO just before the onset of the global financial crisis.  The 
units CIC acquired confer no voting rights, and CIC opted not to appoint any representatives to 
the board.277  The investment suffered a substantial loss when the financial crisis unfolded, as the 
price of Blackstone’s units plummeted.  Nonetheless, CIC has held on to these shares and in fact 
has elected Blackstone to be one of the key managers of its own assets.278  This suggests that 
CIC invested in Blackstone not primarily to earn profits but rather to secure access to expertise 
and human capital.  By securing a successful IPO of Blackstone, they created a long-term rela-
tionship that gives CIC access to management expertise and builds loyalty with one of the most 
sophisticated groups of financial experts from the West.  These relational ties can be interpreted 
as an extension of China’s domestic governance regime for finance:  control through human re-
source management rather than formal ownership rights with the goal of stabilizing the system 
and the powers that control it. 
CIC’s second major investment occurred later in 2007, at a time when the global finan-
cial system already showed serious signs of distress.  In December of 2007, CIC acquired the 
equivalent of a nine percent stake in Morgan Stanley in the form of convertible units at a nine 
percent interest rate.279  The difference in the structure of this investment as compared to the one 
in Blackstone six months earlier suggests that by late 2007, the riskiness of investing in promi-
nent financial intermediaries from the West was apparent to all investors, including CIC.  This 
does not mean that CIC could have foreseen the scale of the crisis, but it does suggest that it was 
not a naïve, inexperienced investor that simply made a bad investment decision.  Not only was 
the nine percent interest rate above prevailing market rates, but it had also become apparent that 
private investors had lost interest in these financial intermediaries.280  Just like other SWFs, CIC 
assumed a critical role as an investor of penultimate resort (the final resort investment was duly 
left to the financial intermediaries’ home central banks).  Indeed, CIC stood ready for another 
rescue operation of Morgan Stanley in September of 2008, when the company found itself on the 
verge of collapse following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  Press reports at the time re-
vealed that CIC considered buying as much as a forty-nine percent stake in the company.281  In 
the end, the transaction did not come through—most likely because both sides feared political 
obstacles, which would have delayed the rescue operation.  Indeed, the investments SWFs had 
made in 2007 and early 2008 had created a political backlash in the United States and triggered a 
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review of rules governing the political review of foreign investments.282  Similarly, CIC faced 
major criticism at home for its substantial losses on its earlier investments in Blackstone and 
Morgan Stanley.283  In the end, Mitsubishi UFJ of Japan acquired a twenty percent stake, and 
subsequently the U.S. government acquired another twenty-five percent stake.  However, less 
than a year later, CIC acquired another forty-seven million shares (at an undisclosed price) to 
help Morgan Stanley repay the funds it had received from the U.S. government, thereby regain-
ing its status as a fully private entity (if one discounts the fact that these stakes were now held by 
a SWF).284  Interestingly, Morgan Stanley was later selected as another key asset manager for 
managing CIC’s overseas investments.285 
Comparing CIC’s investments in Blackstone and Morgan Stanley suggests an emergent 
pattern.  There is little indication that CIC is seeking to control foreign financial intermediaries it 
invests in (i.e. engaging in mercantilism or imperialism in the financial sector).  Instead, it is 
building long-term, reciprocal relations.  At this point in time, CIC still needs foreign expertise to 
confront the vagaries of global financial markets.  The foreign intermediaries were, in turn, de-
pendent on capital that few private investors, if any, were supplying during the global financial 
crisis.  By extending domestic patterns of control over human capital to global markets, CIC is 
creating a critical bridge between China’s domestic financial governance regime and its relation 
to global markets.  The motive for this strategy is not primarily financial.  In fact, the very pur-
pose of investing globally is to reduce China’s current holdings of foreign exchange reserves, 
and in light of the magnitude of these holdings (over  3 trillion dollars as of June 30, 2011),286 
the return on any of CIC’s investments is likely to be trivial.  Instead, the bridge serves the criti-
cal function of ensuring that the CCP has some tools at its disposal to manage global financial 
markets and mitigate any shocks that might emanate from them and create a challenge to its hold 
on power. 
Outside the financial sector, CIC has invested extensively in sectors that supply China 
with critical resources.  They include a twenty percent stake in GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Lim-
ited,287 a seventeen percent stake in the Canadian mining company Teck Resources,288 a fifteen 
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percent stake in AES (U.S.)289 and an eleven percent stake in the Kazakh gas company KazMun-
aiGas.290  These investments are consistent with a mercantilist interpretation but also fit our the-
ory.  Since the future of the CCP as China’s ruling party is directly linked to its ability to deliver 
growth and ensure employment for an additional six million people who enter the Chinese work-
force on an annual basis,291 securing natural resources is a means to serve both ends:  external 
and internal control. 
In general, filings with the SEC show that CIC has invested in numerous companies in 
the United States and elsewhere, but in most cases has only taken small minority stakes.  They 
offer little evidence for the proposition that CIC is on an acquisition spree with the intent of con-
trolling major companies in the United States.292 
In interpreting CIC’s investment strategies, it is important to realize that China itself has 
become deeply dependent on the global financial system.  This implies that China has become 
vulnerable to the volatility of global markets, which in and of itself is a threat to a system that is 
poised to maintain political and economic stability.  Against this background, CIC’s actions ap-
pear less as an aggressive foreign acquisition strategy and instead as an attempt to help buffer the 
impact of global markets.  It does so by using its resources to help mitigate the fallout from the 
global financial crisis and to limit the impact of vast fluctuations in the price of resources and 
commodities that are critical to the Chinese economy.  As the CCP’s legitimacy inside China 
(and perhaps even in the international context) is largely dependent on its ability to ensure con-
tinued economic growth, CIC’s efforts to mitigate China’s vulnerability to the international mar-
ketplace (and thereby sustain its economy in times of crisis) can be viewed as maximizing the 
autonomy of the CCP.  Within China, if the economy is stable (as the CIC is trying to ensure), 
there are fewer competing claims against the party for political influence.  In the international 
context, cooperation from the CIC in stabilizing financial markets (and in rebalancing currency 
reserves) demonstrates that the CCP is a potentially trustworthy counterparty and reduces the sa-
lience of competing accounts of the CCP’s merit in the international system (such as criticisms 
of its role in human rights abuses, etc.). Viewed in this light, China’s preeminent SWF also fits 
our autonomy maximization theory. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
A widely accepted definition of SWFs holds that these entities are government-owned 
and -controlled, and have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities beyond the government itself, so 
they are responsive to the expressed interests and objectives of the government.  There are com-
peting conceptions of what constitutes “governmental interest” in a democratic society, but a dis-
cussion of public choice vs. public interest politics is beyond the scope of this article.  This arti-
cle suggests that in political entities without electoral democracy, such as China, Singapore, 
Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, the government is comprised of ruling elites who are not directly ac-
countable to the public in general:  it is easy to see how “governmental interest” becomes tied to 
the interests of the ruling elite.  Indeed, the internal governance structures of the SWFs them-
selves ensure that SWF management is directly accountable to the ruling elite in each sovereign 
sponsor.  Consequently, it is unsurprising that SWFs can be, and are, wielded to advance the in-
terests of those elites.  First and foremost among these interests is the maintenance of their privi-
leged position. 
The task of maximizing autonomy is, however, complex.  The privileged position of rul-
ing elites in non-democratic countries is dependent on domestic stability, security of the state 
against foreign rivals and the maintenance of substantial autonomy relative to superpowers to 
which they might otherwise be vulnerable.  Without domestic stability, elite status is fragile and 
will last only until the next coup or mass uprising; a foreign invasion would topple existing elites 
or at least subsume them into a hierarchy with foreigners at the top.  Finally, as autonomy rela-
tive to superpowers decreases, the ability to direct state action towards benefiting the elite is re-
stricted and domestic legitimacy may be threatened. 
As is revealed by the detailed case studies presented in this paper, SWFs are well suited 
to serving an autonomy-maximizing function in the domestic arena.  The creation of a SWF en-
sures that wealth stays under the control of the ruling elite rather than passing into the hands of 
the population as a whole.  In the Gulf, the extraction and sale of oil could transform a royally 
monopolized resource into dispersed wealth, but concentrating the resultant revenues into a SWF 
ensures continued royal control.  In Asia, export-led growth could increase the purchasing power 
of the domestic population, but sterilizing the returns by concentrating them in a SWF protects 
against destabilizing currency crises and the rise of new wealthy classes that might challenge the 
existing elite for political control of the state.  Further, once accumulated in a SWF, wealth can 
be strategically deployed in the domestic market to protect the status of elites.  It can be used to 
“buy off” potential political rivals, expand the institutional space for political allies (increasing 
the benefits of aligning oneself with the existing elite) and to fund social programs that satisfy 
the needs of the population as a whole for the foreseeable future.  Finally, SWFs ensure that do-
mestic stabilization strategies can be maintained even in the face of shocks to the system like oil 
price or production declines or falling trade volumes.  Collectively, these effects substantially 
improve domestic stability.  Indeed, as we have shown, several SWFs have used their resources 
in the global crisis and subsequently in the political uprisings in the Middle East to appease po-
tential opponents at home. 
SWFs are equally well suited to maximizing autonomy in the international context by 
improving state security and mitigating the impact of volatile global markets on the domestic 
economy.  First, administering wealth through the public sector rather than funneling it to the 
private bank accounts of the ruling class (as is done in a substantial number of resource-rich 
countries) legitimizes the sovereign sponsor government in the eyes of the international commu-
nity.  In terms of the particulars of administering the fund, SWF investment decisions can also be 
made to directly induce potential threats to state security not to attack or to convince a third party 
to guarantee the security of the state.  Even without such a direct bargain, deploying capital in 
other countries creates economic ties that discourage confrontation and creates relationships that 
provide leverage in times of crisis. 
SWFs can also be used to maintain substantial autonomy relative to superpowers—
whether the United States, as discussed in the case of the Gulf States in particular, or China in 
the case of Singapore—that might otherwise exert pressure to limit the sovereign sponsor’s range 
of viable domestic policy choices.  This is relevant in particular for small countries that cannot 
effectively maintain their own external security.  First, SWFs diversify the revenue stream of the 
sovereign sponsor, insulating against the effects of changes in the terms of trade or other exoge-
nous shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations.  Maintaining foreign-currency-denominated 
assets also decreases vulnerability to currency crises, which effectively increases the range of 
available domestic policy choices in the long term.  Further, SWF investments can be directed 
toward injecting capital or liquidity into the economies of superpowers during their own periods 
of crisis, with the expectation that this assistance will be remembered during future interactions.  
SWFs can also be used to fulfill unspoken “dollar-recycling” obligations that, if unmet, might 
lead to interventions by Western countries.  Finally, SWFs can also be used to secure access to 
natural resources or markets for primary exports, ensuring the long-term viability of current in-
dustrial policy in sovereign sponsors and providing insurance against protectionism in developed 
countries. 
More recently, SWFs have become an important force in global financial relations, not 
primarily because of their size, which is still dwarfed by private investment vehicles, but because 
of their ability and willingness to invest at times when private investors take flight.  These in-
vestments have given rise to a series of interpretations.  Some have stressed the potential danger 
that these “neo-mercantilist” organizations may pose to the capitalist system.  Others have 
painted a more positive picture by suggesting that SWFs could help enhance global social wel-
fare by investing their resources to spur development in less-developed countries, or to invest in 
green technology in an attempt to save the planet from climate change.293  In contrast, this paper 
suggests that these investments, too, are best understood as part of a general strategy aimed at 
autonomy maximization.  SWFs have invested widely in the global financial system and are as 
such dependent on it.  Their willingness to step in when private investors took flight is therefore 
not without self-interest.  In addition, by helping to stabilize global finance they were able to ei-
ther confirm existing relations of reciprocity or establish similar relations.  As discussed in the 
case studies, the financial crisis created an opportunity for the Gulf States to reciprocate the secu-
rity umbrella the United States has offered them in the past.  For China, the crisis created an 
opening to position itself not only as a challenge to U.S. dominance, but as a relational player. 
The actual context in which SWFs were established and operate, we suggest, is crucial 
 
 293. For a discussion of SWFs as potential agents of development, see Javier Santiso, Sovereign Development Funds:  
Financial Actors in the Shifting Wealth of Nations, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOVEREIGN ASSET MANAGEMENT 173 (Malan 
Reitveld ed., 2008); for a discussion of their potential role in green technology, see James Lamont, Norwegian State Fund in 
$4bn Green Push, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at 20. 
for understanding their role and the attractiveness of various investment opportunities at any 
given point in time.  Modeling SWFs according to the standard accounts of state control over 
economic activities, which are derived primarily from the historical experience of the West, 
misses these critical aspects, and is therefore bound to miss the critical determinants of SWF be-
havior both domestically and internationally. 
 
ANNEX—FIGURES AND CHARTS 
Figure 1: Equity Transitions among Abu Dhabi’s SWFs 
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